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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is an ongoing debate about what resources the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) needs to be successful.
1
 On one side of this debate 
are many of the Court’s largest funders, including France, Germany, 
Britain, Italy, and Japan.
2
 They have repeatedly opposed efforts to 
increase the Court’s resources even as its workload has increased 
dramatically in recent years.
3
 On the other side of the debate is the Court 
itself and many of the Court’s supporters within civil society.
4
 They have 
taken the position that it is underfunded and does not have sufficient 
resources to succeed.
5
 This debate has persisted for years and 
disagreements over the ICC’s funding level are now a central feature of 
the Court’s budgeting process.
6
 
 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois. This 
Article was greatly improved by the comments of Professors William Mock and Margaret Ryznar. 
Matts Hermans also provided valuable feedback. Any errors that remain are mine. 
 1. See generally Stuart Ford, How Much Money Does the ICC Need?, in THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015). 
 2. Id. at 90. 
 3. Id. See also Elizabeth Evenson, The ICC: Too Important to Let Fail, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/07/icc-too-important-let-fail. 
 4. See Ford, supra note 1, at 89–92. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Ford, supra note 1, at 92–94 (noting that the Assembly of State Parties ultimately 
increased the ICC’s budget for 2013 despite those countries advocating for a zero growth policy, but 
that the increase was still less than the ICC had asked for). Essentially the same thing happened in 
2014. See Lilian Ochieng & Simon Jennings, ICC Secures Budget Increase, INSTITUTE FOR WAR & 
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As this long-running debate demonstrates, reaching an agreement on 
the level of resources the ICC needs is very difficult. This Article 
contributes to that debate by using an empirical gravity-based approach to 
understand what investigative resources the ICC needs to succeed. This is 
an important part of the overall question of what resources the Court needs 
because the investigations are a critical and sizable component of the 
ICC’s work. First, the investigations are critical because successful 
investigations are a necessary predicate to the trials that are the principal 
work of the ICC.
7
 Second, the investigations are a sizable part of the 
Court’s work because they are very resource intensive.
8
 Thus, 
understanding what resources the ICC needs to complete successful 
investigations is important in determining what resources the Court needs 
as a whole.  
This Article assesses the ICC’s needs by looking at the investigative 
resources that states assign to domestic mass atrocity crimes and then 
comparing them to the investigative resources available to the ICC.
9
 One 
would expect that similar crimes would require similar resources to 
investigate. Thus, the resources devoted to domestic atrocity crime 
investigations can shed light on what resources the ICC needs to be 
successful. If the ICC has similar resources to those devoted to domestic 
mass atrocity investigations, this suggests that the ICC is adequately 
resourced. If, on the other hand, the ICC has fewer resources to conduct its 
investigations than domestic systems use in comparable circumstances, 
this suggests that the ICC is under-resourced. 
 
 
PEACE REPORTING (Jan. 20, 2014), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-secures-budget-increase. The 
same thing is set to occur in 2016 as well. See Coalition for the ICC, ASP 14: Negotiating the 2016 
ICC Budget (Nov. 13, 2015), https://ciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/2015/11/13/asp14-the-courts-
budget-for-2016-tackling-iccs-capacity-crisis/ (noting that the ASP’s Committee on Budget and 
Finance has recommended a budget increase over 2015 but one that is smaller than the Court has 
requested). 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 138–39. 
 8. For example, according to the 2016 budget, the OTP has a total of 218 personnel. See 
Assembly of State Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for 2016 of the International Criminal Court, 
doc. no. ICC-ASP/14/10 (Sept. 2, 2015), tbl.20. Of those 218 personnel, almost half—103—work in 
the Investigation Division. See id. tbl.32. For comparison purposes, the Prosecution Division only has 
45 personnel. Id. tbl.35. Thus, the investigations require nearly half of the OTP’s total personnel and 
more than twice as many personnel as the trials. 
 9. In many ways, this Article can be seen as complementary to an earlier article, Complexity 
and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts, which measured the relative efficiency of the trials at 
domestic and international courts. See Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at International 
Criminal Courts, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1 (2014). This Article makes an analogous comparison 
between domestic and international systems but focuses on the investigations rather than the trials. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2017]   WHAT INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES DOES THE ICC NEED TO SUCCEED? 3 
 
 
 
 
This comparison depends on a way to measure and compare domestic 
and international crimes. This Article uses the concept of gravity for that 
purpose. At its simplest, gravity refers to the seriousness of the crime.
10
 It 
is not, however, an objective characteristic of crimes that can be easily or 
directly measured.
11
 Moreover, there is no generally accepted definition of 
gravity that already exists and can be applied to mass atrocity crimes.
12
 
Thus, the first step in comparing the gravity of different crimes is finding a 
way to measure gravity. 
One of this Article’s most important contributions is its creation of an 
empirical measure of crime gravity. This measure is based upon a 
synthesis of the work of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the ICC, the 
jurisprudence of the Court, the existing scholarship on the gravity of 
international crimes, and domestic studies of crime severity. The result is a 
measure comprised of both quantitative and qualitative factors that permits 
the relative gravity of different crimes to be assessed. This allows the 
crimes investigated by the ICC to be compared to crimes investigated in 
domestic systems.  
Once the crimes investigated at the ICC are compared to the most 
serious mass atrocity crimes investigated in domestic systems, it becomes 
clear that the crimes typically investigated by the ICC are of greater 
gravity than the most serious mass atrocity crimes investigated by states.
13
 
The crimes typically investigated by the ICC occur in more places and 
over a longer period of time. They involve more victims of all kinds, 
including more murder victims, and also regularly involve acts of 
exceptional cruelty. They involve a number of types of victimization that 
are not present in the domestic mass atrocity crimes, including rape, 
torture, unlawful detention, and the forcible displacement of the civilian 
population. In addition, they have a larger impact on the societies where 
they occur. In short, they are more grave. 
As a result of their greater gravity, one would expect that investigating 
the crimes that come before the ICC would require greater resources than 
investigating domestic mass atrocities. Yet, a comparison of the 
investigative resources available to the ICC and the investigative resources 
committed to domestic investigations show that national governments are 
 
 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 23–26. 
 11. Cf. id. at 19 (noting the difference between subjective and objective characteristics). 
 12. See Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the 
International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 269 (2012) (noting that “there is little 
agreement” about how to define gravity). 
 13. See infra Part III.D. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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willing to devote vastly more resources to domestic mass atrocity 
investigations.
14
 In fact, states faced with mass atrocity crimes have been 
willing to devote dozens to hundreds of times more resources to those 
investigations than the ICC is able to devote to its own investigations. This 
disparity is startling and highlights how the ICC has tried to investigate 
some of the most serious crimes imaginable with meager resources.  
There are three main conclusions that can be drawn from the 
comparison of the investigative resources available in domestic and 
international crimes. First, and most obviously, the ICC does not have 
sufficient investigative resources. It has significantly fewer resources than 
states think is appropriate when investigating similar atrocity crimes 
committed on their own territory. Second, this lack of resources has 
contributed to the ICC’s relative lack of success so far. The ICC’s 
investigations have been too “thin” and several prosecutions have 
collapsed or been compromised as a result.
15
 There are, of course, other 
reasons for the difficulties the ICC has experienced.
16
 Nevertheless, the 
ICC’s lack of resources is also to blame for its failure to live up to its 
members’ expectations. Third, increasing the ICC’s investigative 
resources would be an important step in improving the Court’s outcomes. 
The comparison between domestic and international investigations 
suggests that the ICC would be more successful if it had the resources to 
conduct investigations more like those carried out in response to domestic 
mass atrocity crimes. Given that most states agree that a successful ICC is 
desirable,
17
 it follows that most states should support increasing the ICC’s 
investigative resources because doing so would be in their own interest. 
This Article will proceed as follows. Part II explores the meaning of 
crime gravity and its relationship to investigative difficulty. Part III 
explores the gravity of the average ICC investigation and compares that to 
a range of domestic mass atrocity investigations. Part IV describes the 
investigative resources available during the average ICC investigation and 
compares that to the resources available in domestic mass atrocity 
investigations. Finally, Part V contains this Article’s conclusions.  
 
 
 14. See infra Part IV.C. 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 409–11. 
 16. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 412–23 (noting that lack of state cooperation and 
some strategic mistakes have also hampered ICC investigations). 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 431–35. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/5
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II. THE GRAVITY OF CRIMES 
The concept of gravity is central to this Article. Gravity serves as the 
key to comparing the crimes investigated at the ICC to crimes investigated 
in domestic systems. Without a measure of gravity how could one 
meaningfully compare the shooting down of MH17 over Ukraine to the 
bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 over Lockerbie?
18
 Or, how could one 
compare the London train bombings to the attack on the Oklahoma City 
federal building?
19
 It would be even more difficult to compare these 
domestic crimes to the crimes investigated by the ICC, like the post-
election violence in Kenya or the attacks on civilian protesters in Libya.
20
 
Certainly all of these crimes are very serious, but they are also different. 
They are carried out in different ways, by different groups, for different 
purposes, occur in different places, over different time periods, and result 
in different numbers of victims of different types. They are all serious, but 
which is more serious and why?
21
 Creating a measure of relative gravity 
permits crimes committed in different jurisdictions to be compared to one 
another meaningfully. 
Gravity also serves a second purpose in this Article. In addition to 
measuring the seriousness of crimes, it serves as a proxy for the difficulty 
of the resulting criminal investigation. This is because the investigative 
resources necessary to successfully investigate a crime increase as the 
gravity of the crime being investigated increases.
22
 Thus, gravity can be 
used to make inferences about the investigative resources that one would 
need to successfully investigate different crimes. One would expect that 
crimes of similar gravity would be assigned similar investigative 
resources, while crimes of greater gravity would require greater 
investigative resources. Less grave crimes, on the other hand, would 
usually require fewer investigative resources. This relationship between 
gravity and investigative resources makes it possible to evaluate the level 
of investigative resources available to the ICC by comparing the ICC’s 
resources to the resources available in domestic investigations of 
comparable gravity. If the ICC consistently has fewer resources than 
 
 
 18. See discussion infra Parts III.C.7, III.C.1. 
 19. See discussion infra Parts III.C.5, III.C.3. 
 20. See discussion infra Parts III.A.6, II.A.4. 
 21. See deGuzman, supra note 12 (arguing that there is not widespread agreement about how to 
identify the gravest crimes and that different people may reasonably use different criteria). 
 22. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
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domestic investigations despite investigating similarly grave crimes, this 
suggests that the ICC is under-resourced.  
Without a way to measure gravity, this Article would not be possible. 
Thus, the first step is to define gravity and find a way to measure it. The 
second step is to explore the relationship between gravity and investigative 
difficulty. Both of these issues are addressed below. 
A. Defining Gravity 
Generally, gravity refers to the importance or seriousness of a 
phenomenon.
23
 Of course, it has other meanings,
24
 but in this Article it 
refers to the importance or seriousness of a crime or group of related 
crimes. The concept of crime gravity is roughly synonymous with both 
crime severity and crime seriousness,
25
 but this Article will use the term 
gravity over the alternatives because that is the term used in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.
26
  
As a result of its inclusion in the Rome Statute, gravity is an important 
concept at the ICC.
27
 The gravity of the crimes is a factor the Prosecutor 
must consider before initiating investigations.
28
 In addition, the Court is 
required to consider whether the cases advanced by the Prosecutor are of 
sufficient gravity before it can hear them,
29
 and gravity plays a role at 
sentencing.
30
 In fact, the term is used nine times in the Rome Statute.
31
 In 
 
 
 23. See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (Angus Stevenson & Christine Lindberg eds., 3d 
ed. 2010) (defining gravity as “extreme or alarming importance; seriousness”). 
 24. See, e.g., id. (“the force that attracts a body toward the center of the earth”). 
 25. See Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400, 1400 (2009) (noting that gravity and seriousness are synonymous). 
 26. The terms severity or seriousness will sometimes be used as alternatives to gravity for 
stylistic purposes, but they should be viewed as simply another way of saying gravity, unless the text 
explicitly indicates otherwise. 
 27. See generally deGuzman, supra note 25. 
 28. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 53(1)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. See also deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1412–15 (describing the 
Prosecutor’s obligation to consider gravity before initiating an investigation). 
 29. See Rome Statute art. 17(1)(d) (noting that the court is required to conclude that a case is of 
sufficient gravity before that case is admissible before the court). 
 30. Id. art. 78(1) (noting that the court “shall” consider the gravity of the crime when determining 
the sentence). 
 31. Id. art. 7(1)(g) (referring to the gravity of crimes of sexual violence); art. 17(1)(d) (referring 
to the gravity of individual cases); art 53(1)(c) (referring to the gravity of the crimes being 
investigated); art. 53(2)(c) (referring to the gravity of the crimes being investigated); art. 59(3) 
(referring to the gravity of the crimes being charged); art. 77(1)(b) (referring to the gravity of the 
crimes for which an individual has been found guilty); art. 78(1) (referring to the gravity of the crimes 
for which an individual has been found guilty); art. 84(1)(c) (referring to the gravity of official 
misconduct); art. 90(7)(b) (referring to the gravity of the charged conduct). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/5
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all but one of those instances, it refers to the seriousness of criminal 
conduct.
32
  
Despite requiring various organs within the ICC to make 
determinations about the gravity of crimes, the Rome Statute does not 
define the term.
33
 Nevertheless, the OTP must have a way to evaluate the 
gravity of crimes because the OTP cannot open an investigation unless the 
crimes being investigated are of sufficient gravity,
34
 and it cannot send a 
case to trial unless the charges are sufficiently grave.
35
 Thus, it makes 
sense to begin searching for a measure of gravity by looking at the 
definition that has been adopted by the OTP. 
1.  The OTP’s Definition 
The OTP must have a way to assess the gravity of crimes so that it can 
comply with the requirements of the Rome Statute.
36
 And indeed, the OTP 
has developed a definition that it uses to evaluate the relative gravity of the 
crimes it investigates and prosecutes.
37
 This definition is set out in the 
OTP’s internal regulations, which state that the gravity of crimes should 
be measured based on: (1) their scale; (2) their nature; (3) the manner of 
their commission; and (4) their impact.
38
 These four factors are vague and 
open-ended, and there have been calls for the OTP to explain in more 
detail what they mean.
39
 Perhaps in response to those criticisms, the OTP 
 
 
 32. See supra note 31. The only time that the term gravity is used in the Rome Statute to refer to 
something other than the seriousness of criminal conduct is when it is used to refer to judicial 
misconduct that might serve as the basis for a revision of the conviction or sentence. See Rome Statute 
art. 84(1)(c). 
 33. See Susana SáCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Gravity Threshold of the International 
Criminal Court, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 807, 817 (2008) (noting that “because the term ‘gravity’ is 
not defined in the Rome Statute or any of the other governing documents of the ICC, the appropriate 
role of ‘gravity’ in the ICC remains a matter of debate”). But see deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1406–
08 (arguing that some hints about the meaning of gravity can be deduced from the elements of the 
crimes that are within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction). 
 34. See Rome Statute art. 53(a)(1)(c). 
 35. See Rome Statute art. 17(1)(d). 
 36. See supra text accompanying notes 34–35. 
 37. This definition evolved over time, and it took several years before it reached its current form. 
See SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33, at 824–26 (2008) (noting that the OTP’s definition of gravity 
developed over time). 
 38. See Office of the Prosecutor [OTP], Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Doc. No. 
ICC-BD/05-01-09 (Apr. 23, 2009), at Reg. 29(2). See also Office of the Prosecutor, Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities (2015) ¶ 7 (Nov. 12, 2015) (noting that gravity includes an 
assessment of the “scale, nature, manner of commission of the crimes, and their impact”); Office of the 
Prosecutor [OTP], Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations ¶ 9 (Nov. 2013) (same). 
 39. See Ignaz Stegmiller, The Gravity Threshold under the ICC Statute: Gravity Bach and Forth 
in Lubanga and Ntaganda, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 547, 564 (2009) (noting that the four factors laid out 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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explained how it would evaluate each of the factors in its 2013 Policy 
Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
According to the OTP, the scale of the crimes can be assessed by 
looking at “the number of direct and indirect victims, the extent of the 
damage caused by the crimes, . . . [and] their geographical or temporal 
spread . . . .”
40
 This factor focuses on the number of victims and the scope 
of the crimes. It acknowledges that crimes become more grave as the 
number of victims increases and as their geographic and temporal scope 
increases. 
The nature of the crimes “refers to the specific elements of each 
offense such as the killings, rapes, and other crimes . . . .”
41
 In effect, the 
nature of the crimes refers to the specific kinds of wrongful acts that have 
been committed like murder, rape, or torture. It also implicitly recognizes 
that there is a hierarchy among crimes and that some kinds of crimes are 
graver than others. For example, as noted below, killings are generally 
viewed as more grave than rapes, which are in turn viewed as more grave 
than assaults.
42
  
The manner of the commission of the crimes focuses on how the 
crimes were carried out, in particular “the extent to which the crimes were 
systematic or result from a plan or organized policy . . ., [any] elements of 
particular cruelty, including the vulnerability of the victims, [and] any 
motives involving discrimination.”
43
 This factor recognizes that even 
though two crimes may be legally equivalent (e.g., two murders), the way 
in which those crimes are carried out can affect their gravity.
44
 Thus, 
crimes that are organized or systematic are more grave than crimes that 
lack this feature. Crimes that target vulnerable groups, like women, 
children or the elderly, are more grave than crimes that do not. Crimes of 
exceptional cruelty are more grave than the same crime carried out without 
exceptional cruelty. 
Finally, the impact of the crimes is assessed by the “suffering[] endured 
by the victims . . . , or the social, economic and environmental damage 
inflicted on the affected communities.
45
 It thus focuses on the effect of the 
 
 
in Internal Regulation 29(2) require further “definition” and proposing that the OTP enlarge upon their 
meaning in “another policy paper”). 
 40. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 38, ¶ 62. 
 41. Id. ¶ 63. 
 42. See infra text accompanying note 110. 
 43. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 38, ¶ 64. 
 44. See infra text accompanying note 112. 
 45. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 38, ¶ 65. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/5
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crimes on the victims and their communities. It acknowledges that the 
consequences of the crimes for the victims also affect their gravity. Taken 
together, these four factors are used by the OTP to assess the potential 
gravity of crimes when considering whether to open an investigation.
46
 
The gravity evaluation is not a purely mathematical process and the 
OTP has acknowledged that it includes both “quantitative and qualitative 
considerations.”
47
 Some factors, like the number of victims of various 
crimes, lend themselves to a quantitative approach. Other factors, like 
whether the crimes were carried out in an exceptionally cruel manner, are 
qualitative. These quantitative and qualitative factors are combined to 
assess the overall gravity of the crimes under consideration.  
These factors could be used to create a measure of crime gravity, but is 
the OTP’s definition of gravity a good one? Is it the best one? The OTP 
has developed the most comprehensive definition of gravity of any of the 
organs at the ICC, but perhaps there are alternative definitions that are 
better? Thus, this Article will consider several alternative sources of a 
gravity definition. First, it will look at the drafting history of the Rome 
Statute to determine whether the creators of the ICC had a particular 
definition in mind. Next, it will look at the Court’s decisions on gravity. 
Third, it will consider the work of international criminal law scholars who 
have written about the gravity requirement in the Rome Statute. Finally, it 
will look beyond the ICC at the literature on domestic crime severity. 
Taken together, these should point the way to a definition that can be used 
as a basis for an empirical measure of crime gravity. 
2. The Drafting History of the Rome Statute 
While gravity is not defined in the Rome Statute,
48
 one place to look 
for a definition is its drafting history.
49
 The concept of gravity in 
international criminal law predates the Rome Statute by several decades.
50
 
The International Law Commission (ILC) began to focus on gravity in the 
1980s as part of its work on a Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
 
 
 46. Id. ¶ 66. 
 47. See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 38, ¶ 61 (noting that the ICC has 
taken the position that gravity “includes both quantitative and qualitative considerations”). 
 48. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
 49. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(indicating that the “preparatory work of a treaty” may be used as a supplementary means of 
interpreting the treaty). 
 50. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1416–21. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Security of Mankind.
51
 Some members of the ILC suggested using gravity 
to determine which international crimes should be included in the Draft 
Code.
52
 The ILC did eventually decide to focus on the gravest crimes for 
inclusion in the Draft Code, but it was never able to agree on a formal 
definition of gravity.
53
  
In the 1990s, the ILC began work on what would later become the 
Rome Statute.
54
 One of the initial questions the ILC faced was which 
crimes to include within the jurisdiction of the Court. Some participants 
felt that all international crimes should be within the jurisdiction of the 
court, while others felt that only the gravest crimes should be included.
55
 
After much debate, the drafters of the Rome Statute eventually agreed that 
the ICC should focus on the gravest crimes, but they were again unable to 
agree on a formal definition of gravity.
56
 As a result, the term ended up 
being used extensively in the Rome Statute but it is never defined.
57
  
This history demonstrates that at the time the Rome Statute was drafted 
everyone involved knew that gravity would play an important role at the 
ICC. The drafters were also aware of the lack of a definition, but were not 
able to supply the Court with an explicit definition.
58
 In short, there was 
no agreement on a definition of gravity prior to the entry into force of the 
Rome Statute. Ultimately, the drafting history does not provide much 
insight into the meaning of gravity.
59
  
 
 
 51. Id. at 1417. The Draft Code was an attempt to identify and codify the elements of 
international criminal law. See Stuart Ford, Crimes Against Humanity at the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia: Is a Connection with Armed Conflict Required?, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN 
L.J. 125, 153 (2007). 
 52. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1418. 
 53. Id. at 1418. 
 54. Id. at n.80. 
 55. Id. at 1419–20. 
 56. Id. at 1419–21, 1424. See also SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33, at 820–23 (noting that the 
drafters of the Rome Statute consciously chose to retain gravity as a requirement but that no explicit 
definition of gravity was provided). 
 57. See supra text accompanying notes 27–33. 
 58. See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1424 (noting that the Chilean delegation at the Rome 
Conference specifically requested that gravity be defined but that there was insufficient support for the 
proposal). 
 59. The drafting history does indicate that all of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC 
were considered by the drafters to be grave crimes. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
Unfortunately, this insight is not very useful in deriving an empirical measure of gravity. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/5
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3. The Decisions 
The next logical place to look for guidance is in the Court’s decisions. 
Since the Court is required to consider whether the cases that come before 
it are of sufficient gravity to be admissible,
60
 gravity has been discussed in 
a number of cases. The first time it came up was in the Lubanga case. 
However, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on gravity in that case was 
harshly criticized by scholars and overruled by the Appeals Chamber.
61
 
The Appeals Chamber did not, however, offer its own definition.
62
 This 
forced the Pre-Trial Chamber to essentially start over from scratch. This 
Article will focus on the court’s subsequent attempts to define gravity. 
In February 2010 in the Abu Garda case, Pre-Trial Chamber I proposed 
a new definition of gravity that focused on the “nature, manner and 
impact” of the alleged crimes.
63
 Later decisions referenced the Abu Garda 
decision but reframed the definition of gravity into the four factors that the 
OTP is currently using: scale, nature, manner of commission, and 
impact.
64
 While the latest decision contains an interesting disagreement 
between the judges of Pre-Trial Chamber I about how to apply those 
factors in the specific situation under consideration,
65
 the Pre-Trial 
Chambers have consistently used the OTP’s definition since 2010.  
It is noticeable, however, that the Pre-Trial Chamber decisions are 
largely devoid of reasoning. To begin with, the Abu Garda decision’s 
definition of gravity was proposed by the OTP.
66
 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
 
 
 60. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
 61. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1425–28 (noting that the first Pre-Trial Chamber decision 
that offered a definition of gravity was overturned by the Appeals Chamber); Stephen Eliot Smith, 
Inventing the Laws of Gravity: The ICC’s Initial Lubanga Decision and its Regressive Consequences, 
8 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 331 (2008) (arguing that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s first decision on the meaning 
of gravity was misguided); SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33 (same). 
 62. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1425–28. 
 63. See Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, ¶ 31 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
 64. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 
of the Rome Statute on Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
¶ 188 (Mar. 31, 2010); Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, Corrigendum to 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, ¶ 204 (Nov. 15, 2011); Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of 
the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, Decision on the 
request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an 
investigation, ¶ 21 (July 16, 2015). 
 65. See Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia, supra note 64. Judge Peter Kovacs, in dissent, criticizes the way in 
which the majority applied the gravity factors. Id. at Annex. 
 66. See Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, supra note 63, ¶ 31 n.57. 
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reasoning boils down to “agree[ing] with the Prosecution” that “several 
factors may be taken into account in the assessment of the gravity of a 
case.”
67
 It then adopted the Prosecution’s proposed definition.
68
 There is 
no discussion of why these are the appropriate factors or whether the 
Chamber considered other definitions before adopting the Prosecution’s 
definition. The later decisions simply restate the four factor test without 
debate. The only authority they offer for this definition is a citation to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber decision in Abu Garda.
69
 There is little evidence that 
the Pre-Trial Chambers have given much thought to how to define gravity 
or whether the Prosecution’s preferred definition is the best one available. 
Ultimately, the court’s decisions on gravity support the OTP’s definition, 
but the lack of reasoning means they provide only weak support. 
4.  Scholarship on Gravity 
Turning now to the scholarship, a number of international criminal law 
scholars have analyzed the gravity requirement in the Rome Statute.
70
 The 
most thorough of these articles is written by Professor deGuzman. She 
proposes that gravity be measured by six factors, four of which are the 
same factors that the OTP and the Pre-Trial Chambers have adopted.
71
 Her 
two additional factors relate to the role and intent of the perpetrator.
72
 
While Professor deGuzman is correct that a focus on the role and intent of 
the perpetrator is necessary to assess the gravity of a particular case 
brought to trial at the ICC, these factors are less relevant to determining 
the overall gravity of a situation that the ICC is investigating.
73
 Since this 
Article is concerned with assessing the gravity of situations rather than 
assessing the charges against particular accused persons, factors related to 
 
 
 67. Id. ¶ 31. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, supra note 64, ¶ 204; Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, supra note 64, ¶ 21. 
 70. See deGuzman, supra note 25; SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33; Smith, supra note 61; 
Stegmiller, supra note 39. 
 71. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1449–56. 
 72. Id. at 1454–56. 
 73. Id. at 1451 (arguing that factors relevant to the perpetrators must be considered when the 
gravity of particular charged crimes are determined under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, but 
acknowledging that “when such determinations relate to situations, the perpetrator-related factors will 
often be irrelevant since the likely perpetrators may not yet be known”). See also Stegmiller, supra 
note 39, at 563 (distinguishing between the concept of “gravity of the crime” which refers to the 
severity of the offence and “gravity of the case” which refers to the specifics of particular charges 
against an individual and “might be broader, including the circumstances of the individual”). 
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particular perpetrators will not be used to assess gravity in this Article. 
Ultimately, Professor deGuzman essentially agrees with the OTP that 
gravity of situations should be measured by the scale, nature, manner of 
commission, and impact of the crimes.
74
 
Professor deGuzman also offers some proposals about how to assess 
these four factors. She suggests that the scale of the crimes should focus 
on the number of victims as well as the geographic and temporal scope of 
the violence.
75
 The nature of the harm should focus on the relative 
seriousness of different acts. In this regard, she argues that there is a 
hierarchy of criminal acts, with murder being the most serious, crimes of 
sexual violence being almost as serious as murder, and crimes that involve 
serious physical or psychological suffering—like torture—being lower on 
the scale.
76
 Property crimes will generally rank as the least serious form of 
criminality.
77
 
According to Professor deGuzman, the manner of commission factor 
should focus on factors such as the systematic nature of the crimes, 
whether they are the result of a plan or policy, whether they involve 
particular cruelty,
78
 and whether the victims are members of vulnerable 
groups like women, children or the elderly.
79
 Finally, she argues that the 
“impact of the crimes” factor should focus on whether the crimes have an 
effect on society beyond the effect on immediate victims.
80
 For example, 
she notes that attacks on humanitarian workers could have an impact on 
many people beyond the workers themselves because of the possibility 
that the attacks will disrupt the delivery of crucial aid.
81
 It is striking how 
similar this analysis is to the OTP’s explanation of the gravity factors in its 
2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.
82
 Indeed, it seems 
possible that the OTP’s definition of gravity was influenced by Professor 
deGuzman’s article, although her article is not cited in the Policy Paper on 
Preliminary Examinations. 
 
 
 74. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1451–54. 
 75. Id. at 1451–52. 
 76. Id. at 1452. 
 77. Id. 
 78. As an example of particular cruelty, Professor deGuzman suggests that “deliberately slow 
killing” would qualify as a “particularly heinous way” to commit murder. Id. at 1453. 
 79. Id. at 1453. 
 80. Id. at 1453–54. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 40–45.  
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Dr. Stegmiller also broadly agrees with the OTP’s four factor approach 
to gravity.
83
 He does question whether the fourth factor (impact) is an 
appropriate consideration,
84
 but he is willing to accept impact as a gravity 
factor if it relates to the impact on the victims rather than the impact on 
non-victims.
85
 In this regard, he disagrees with Professor deGuzman, who 
would consider the impact on non-victims as a component of gravity.
86
 Dr. 
Stegmiller also recommended that the OTP flesh out what it meant by 
scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact,
87
 which it subsequently 
did.
88
 
Professors SáCouto and Cleary have also weighed in on the meaning of 
gravity. In their article, they argue that the OTP should be flexible in 
determining which factors to consider in particular situations.
89
 But they 
also recommend that the OTP consider factors like the scale and 
“systematicity” of the crimes, the impact of the crimes on the victims, the 
manner in which the crimes were carried out, and the vulnerability of the 
victims.
90
 They base these recommendations, in part, on the factors that 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) used in assessing 
the gravity of the accused’s crimes at sentencing.
91
 While Professors 
SáCouto and Cleary do not use exactly the same terminology as the OTP, 
there is substantial overlap between their recommendations and the 
definition the OTP ultimately adopted.
92
 
Ultimately, the scholars who have considered how the OTP should 
define gravity have made recommendations that are largely consistent with 
the definition the OTP adopted.
93
 Of course, there is some disagreement 
among the academics, but there is also a high level of agreement.
94
 Thus, 
the international criminal law scholarship supports the OTP’s definition. 
 
 
 83. See Stegmiller, supra note 39, at 560–61. 
 84. Id. at 560 (“In my view, broader impact clearly belongs to other potential considerations 
under the ‘interests of justice’ clause.”). 
 85. Id. at 561 (“If the Prosecutor thereby refers to the narrower impact on victims, an inclusion 
into the gravity criterion could be approved.”). 
 86. See supra text accompanying notes 80–81. 
 87. See Stegmiller, supra note 83, at 564. 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 40–47. 
 89. SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33, at 843. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 840–42. 
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 38–47. 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 70–92. 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 85–87. 
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5. Crime Severity Studies 
A final way to evaluate the OTP’s definition is to look at gravity 
definitions that are unrelated to the ICC. One body of work that addresses 
the seriousness of crimes in a completely different context is the field of 
crime severity studies. This is a growing body of literature that studies 
how people perceive the severity of different crimes, although it has 
focused exclusively on domestic crimes so far. This section will use the 
results of empirical studies of crime severity to assess the OTP’s 
definition.  
An important question in the field has been whether crime severity can 
or should be studied empirically.
95
 Some authors have argued that 
evaluating crime gravity should not be an objective process.
96
 On the other 
hand, other writers have argued that crime gravity can and should be 
evaluated empirically.
97
 The empirical approach to crime severity is 
founded on the premise that if there is some basic agreement about the 
relative gravity of different crimes that most people share, then it should 
be possible to create a gravity measure that would be widely accepted as 
accurate.
98
 And indeed, there is “wide general agreement and stability 
across different social sectors and populations groups with regard to the 
relative seriousness of behaviors considered to be criminal.”
99
 This 
 
 
 95. See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 
91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1830–31 (2007) (noting that while discussions of crime seriousness have 
historically been based on “a philosophical concept of justice, drawn from the reasoned analysis of 
moral philosophers” there has been recent interest in an “empirical conception” which could be 
“subject to empirical testing”). 
 96. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1401–02 (noting the difficulty of ranking or quantifying 
human suffering). Cf. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND 
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 76 (1985) (“Rating crimes is ultimately a matter 
of making value judgments, on which persons reasonably may differ.”); Michael Tonry, Obsolescence 
and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1263–64 (2005) (arguing that 
it is not desirable to create an empirical measure of crime gravity). 
 97. See generally Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 95. See also Jeffrey Bellin, Crime Severity 
Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA 
L. REV. 1, 26 (2011) (arguing that courts should not be permitted to define crime severity entirely 
subjectively). 
 98. See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 
1633, 1635–36 (2007) (noting that creating a ranking of crime gravity that will be broadly accepted 
depends on there being general agreement about what makes one crime more serious than another). 
See also Bellin, supra note 97, at 26–29 (arguing that “[g]uideposts must be erected to ensure 
predictability . . . [and] create consistency . . . .”). 
 99. See Sergio Herzog, The Relationship Between Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness and 
Support for Plea-Bargaining Practices in Israel: A Factorial-Survey Approach, 94 CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 103, 107 (2003). See also Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 95, at 1854–55 (2007) 
(noting that there is “broad consensus regarding the relative seriousness of different wrongdoings” and 
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agreement holds true not just within countries but also across different 
countries.
100
 Thus, it should be possible to create a measure of gravity that 
incorporates criteria that are generally understood to be associated with 
crime severity and which produces an assessment of relative gravity that 
most people would agree with.
101
  
Unfortunately, the existing studies of crime gravity focus on the kinds 
of crimes that occur most frequently in domestic settings.
102
 For example, 
in one such study by Professors Robinson and Kurzban, the study 
participants were asked to rank twenty-four potential crimes.
103
 The 
crimes ranged in seriousness and included such things as “theft by taking, 
theft by fraud, property destruction, assault, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, 
rape, negligent homicide, manslaughter, murder and torture . . . .”
104
 The 
crime that was consistently ranked as the most grave included the rape, 
torture, and subsequent murder of a child.
105
 This is consistent with most 
surveys of crime severity, which find that violent crimes, particularly 
those that lead to death or serious injury, are consistently viewed as the 
most serious.
106
 But as awful as this crime is, it pales in comparison to the 
crimes that are typically investigated by the ICC.
107
 Thus, the existing 
crime severity literature sheds little light on which of the following crimes 
 
 
that this consensus exists across “a variety of issues and demographics”); Id. at 1855–59 (summarizing 
the results of numerous studies that have shown broad agreement about the relative gravity of different 
crimes). 
 100. See Robinson et al., supra note 98, at 1637 (noting that there is widespread agreement about 
how to rank the seriousness of crimes both across different demographic groups within countries and 
between individuals from different countries); Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 95, at 1862–65 (2007) 
(describing how the results on crime severity first obtained in the United States have been replicated 
by studies in many other countries). 
 101. Cf. Bellin, supra note 97, at 25–31 (arguing that it is possible to create a framework for 
understanding the gravity of crimes that is basically objective in nature). 
 102. See, e.g., Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 95, at 1867 n.172 (noting that the authors chose 
their scenarios because they covered the sorts of crimes most often committed in the United States). 
 103. Id. at 1867. 
 104. Id. The complete text of the crimes is included in Robinson and Kurzban’s article at 
Appendix A. 
 105. Scenario 24 was the one that almost everybody in their study ranked as the most serious. Id. 
at 1869. The complete text of Scenario 24 was: “John kidnaps an 8 year-old girl for ransom, rapes her, 
then records the child’s screams as he burns her with a cigarette lighter, sending the recording to her 
parents to induce them to pay his ransom demand. Even though they pay as directed, John strangles the 
child to death to avoid leaving a witness.” Id. at 1898. 
 106. See Herzog, supra note 99, at 107. See also Stuart P. Green, Why It’s A Crime to Tear the 
Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY 
L.J. 1533, 1564–65 (1997) (noting that in many surveys of crime severity, the most serious crimes 
included things like planting a bomb in a public building that explodes killing twenty people, beating a 
young child to death, the deliberate killing of a person for a fee, and the forcible rape of a neighbor). 
 107. See infra Part III.B (describing the average ICC investigation). 
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people would view as more grave: 500 murders; 1,000 rapes; or forcing 
100,000 people to flee their homes. As a result, that literature cannot easily 
be used to create a gravity measure that would apply directly to the crimes 
typically investigated by the ICC.  
Nevertheless, the OTP’s approach is consistent with the existing 
literature on crime severity because it focuses on factors like the number 
of victims, the specific harm the victims suffered, the type of victim, and 
the manner in which the crimes were carried out.
108
 These are all factors 
that have been found to be important to individuals’ assessment of crime 
gravity. For example, in The National Survey of Crime Severity, 
participants rated a number of different variations on a person planting a 
bomb in a public building. The severity of the crime increased as the 
number of victims increased.
109
 The National Survey of Crime Severity 
also found that killings were generally more serious than rapes, which 
were more serious than the infliction of physical injury, which was itself 
more serious than property crimes.
110
 The identity of the victim also 
matters, with crimes against children generally being viewed as more 
serious than the same crime against an adult.
111
 Finally, the manner in 
which the crime was carried out mattered, even when the harm was held 
constant.
112
 Taken together, these findings suggest that the OTP’s gravity 
definition is appropriate because it focuses on many of the same factors 
that empirical studies of crime severity have found to be indicators of 
gravity. 
There is definitely room, however, for empirical studies of crime 
severity that focus on the kinds of crimes (and the kinds of crime 
participation) that occur most frequently in serious violations of 
international criminal law.
113
 Such a study might indicate a better way to 
 
 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 38–45. 
 109. See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY (June 1985) 
at vi (“[The] consequences strongly affect the ratings, a fact that is repeatedly apparent when similar 
crimes with different outcomes are examined. For example, the items scored 72.1, 43.9, 33.0, and 24.5 
are all the same, planting a bomb that goes off in a public building. The outcomes range from 20 
people killed to no one injured, and the scores descend in seriousness reflecting the differing 
outcomes.”). 
 110. This can be seen quite clearly from the rank ordering of the crimes. Id. at vi–x. The crimes 
that were ranked as most serious involved the death of a victim. Rape appears on the list after the 
crimes involving the death of the victim and before the crimes that involved physical injury to the 
victim. The crimes that were ranked as least serious involved damage to or theft of property. Id. 
 111. Id. at vi. See also id. at 47. 
 112. See id. at 28, tbl.18 (noting that a crime carried out with a gun was ranked as more severe 
than the same crime carried out with a lead pipe, which was itself ranked as more severe than the same 
crime carried out without any weapon).  
 113. For example, Professor deGuzman suggests that there is no easy way to measure the gravity 
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create a measure of gravity that would be tailored to the kinds of crimes 
that are usually investigated and prosecuted at the ICC. But in the 
meantime, the OTP’s gravity definition is consistent with the results of 
empirical crime severity studies. 
B. Measuring the Gravity of Mass Atrocities 
The OTP’s definition of gravity is a reasonable basis for a gravity 
measure. First, the Rome Statute does not contain a definition of gravity 
and the drafting history does not suggest one either.
114
 Second, the OTP’s 
definition is consistent with the definition that has been adopted by the 
Pre-Trial Chambers, although it is not clear how much effort the Pre-Trial 
Chamber has put into defining gravity.
115
 Third, the scholars who have 
considered how the OTP should define gravity have made 
recommendations that are consistent with the definition the OTP 
ultimately adopted.
116
 Of course, there is some disagreement among the 
academics, but there is more agreement than disagreement.
117
 The OTP’s 
approach also appears to be generally consistent with how other 
international criminal courts have defined gravity, albeit in the somewhat 
different context of sentencing decisions.
118
 Finally, the OTP’s definition 
is consistent with empirical studies of crime severity. Taken together, this 
suggests that the OTP’s gravity definition is an appropriate one. Thus, this 
Article’s gravity measure is based on the OTP’s explanation of gravity in 
its 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.
119
  
The next problem becomes how to convert the OTP’s definition into a 
measure that can be used to compare the gravity of crimes committed in 
different settings. As the OTP has noted, some of the factors it considers 
can be reduced to quantitative measures, most notably the number of 
victims. But gravity is not solely a function of these quantitative 
components and also is comprised of some qualitative components. The 
 
 
of international crimes and that reasonable people can differ in their gravity determinations. She seems 
to suggest that there is no way to create a broadly-accepted measure of gravity. See deGuzman, supra 
note 12, at 288 (arguing that determinations of “[s]eriousness of harm” are individualized and 
“incommensurable”). Given the findings of domestic crime severity surveys, it seems likely that 
Professor deGuzman is wrong and that there is some agreement about how to rank the most serious 
crimes, but we will not know where the areas of agreement are until the issue is studied empirically. 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 50–58. 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 61–69. 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 70–92. 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 85–87. 
 118. SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33, at 840–42 (2007). 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 40–45. 
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factors that make up this Article’s gravity measure were chosen so that 
they would capture as much of the OTP’s definition as possible, both the 
quantitative and qualitative components. 
The gravity measure used in this Article is comprised of eight factors: 
(1) the number of crime sites
120
 included in the investigation; (2) the 
amount of time over which the crimes occurred; (3) the structure and 
organization of the alleged perpetrator groups; (4) the identity of the 
victims, particularly whether the victims were civilians and whether 
women or children were targeted; (5) the number of the victims, including 
the particular number of victims who were killed, raped, wounded, or 
displaced; (6) the use of exceptionally cruel or brutal means of conducting 
the crimes; (7) whether the crimes were carried out with a discriminatory 
motive; and (8) the legal qualification of the crimes (i.e., whether the ICC 
is treating the crimes as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or 
genocide). Taken together, these eight factors permit the seriousness of 
different mass atrocity crimes to be meaningfully compared to one 
another.
121
  
These factors were chosen because they shed light on the scale, nature, 
manner of commission and impact of the crimes. The first factor, the 
number of crime sites, indicates the number of places at which crimes 
have occurred. It thus measures the geographic scope of the crimes, a 
component of the scale of the crimes.
122
 The second factor, the amount of 
time over which the crimes occurred, relates to the temporal scope of the 
crimes and is also a component of the scale of the crimes.
123
 As the 
geographic and temporal scope of the crime increases, its gravity 
increases. 
The third factor, the structure and organization of the perpetrator 
groups, is related to the manner in which the crimes are committed.
124
 
Systematic crimes are more likely to be committed by hierarchically-
organized groups because the hierarchical nature of such organizations 
 
 
 120. A crime site is a location where the prosecution believes a crime (or part of a crime) within 
the jurisdiction of the court may have occurred. See Stuart Ford, The Complexity of International 
Criminal Trials Is Necessary, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 151, 161 (2015). 
 121. Cf. Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 95, at 1854–55 (noting that while people do not always 
agree on the absolute seriousness of different crimes, there is much more agreement on the relative 
seriousness of different crimes). This means that, while it may not be possible to make an absolute 
determination of the seriousness of different mass atrocity crimes, it ought to be possible to make 
relative determinations of the seriousness of these crimes such that they can be compared to one 
another. Id. at n.114. 
 122. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
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makes it much easier to implement them. And indeed, the majority of 
serious international crimes are carried out by hierarchically-organized 
groups.
125
 Thus, the structure and organization of the perpetrator groups 
can act as a proxy for the systematic nature of the crimes, and crimes that 
are committed systematically or pursuant to an organized policy are more 
grave.
126
 
The fourth factor focuses on the identity of the victims, particularly 
whether the victims are civilian and whether they are women or children. 
This factor goes to the manner of the commission of the crimes, including 
whether they were directed at vulnerable victims.
127
 Civilians, particularly 
women and children, are vulnerable victims and targeting them increases 
the gravity of the crime.  
The fifth factor focuses on the number of victims who suffered 
particular harms, including death, rape, serious injury, and displacement. 
This factor contributes to the scale of the crimes
128
 and their nature.
129
 It 
can also serve as a measure of the impact of the crimes because it indicates 
both the magnitude of the suffering of the victims and the likely impact of 
the crimes on the victims’ communities.
130
 As the number of victims 
increases the gravity of the crime increases too. Similarly, as the particular 
harms become more serious, the gravity of the overall crime increases.  
The sixth factor, the use of cruel or brutal means of committing the 
crimes, is relevant to the manner of the commission of the crimes.
131
 
Crimes that exhibit particular cruelty or brutality are more grave. 
Similarly, the seventh factor, the presence of a discriminatory motive, also 
goes to the manner of commission.
132
 Crimes that are carried out with a 
discriminatory motive are also more grave. 
Finally, the eighth factor, the legal qualification of the crimes, can shed 
light on the intent of the perpetrators, a factor in the assessment of the 
manner in which the crimes were carried out.
133
 This is true because one 
 
 
 125. See infra text accompanying note 153. 
 126. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 38, ¶ 64 (noting that crimes are more 
grave if they are “systematic” or “result from a plan or organized policy”). 
 127. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 128. Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 38, ¶ 62 (noting that the number of victims is a 
component of the scale of the crimes). 
 129. Id. ¶ 63 (noting that the types of wrongful acts committed are a component of the nature of 
the crimes). 
 130. Id. ¶ 65. 
 131. Id. ¶ 64. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (noting that the manner of commission can be assessed by, among other things, the “intent 
of the perpetrator” and “any motives involving discrimination”). 
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of the crimes—genocide—requires a discriminatory motive.
134
 It can also 
shed light on the impact of the crimes because genocide requires that the 
perpetrators intend to “destroy, in whole or in part,” a protected group.
135
 
The requirement of an attempt to destroy a protected group implies a large 
impact on the victim group. These eight factors serve as the basis for this 
Article’s assessment of the relative gravity of both the crimes investigated 
by the ICC and the most serious mass atrocity crimes investigated in 
domestic systems.  
C.  Gravity and the Difficulty of Criminal Investigations 
In addition to measuring the gravity of the crimes, these factors serve 
another function in this Article. As shown below, the resources necessary 
for a successful investigation generally increase as the gravity of the 
crimes being investigated increases.
136
 Thus, the gravity factors both 
indicate the difficulty of investigating the alleged crimes and act as a 
proxy for the investigative resources necessary to successfully complete an 
investigation.
137
  
The goal of every criminal investigation is to identify and collect 
evidence sufficient to establish whether a crime has been committed and, 
if so, identify who is legally responsible for that crime.
138
 No criminal trial 
 
 
 134. See Rome Statute, supra note 28, art. 6 (noting that the crime of genocide requires that the 
physical elements be carried out with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group as such”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See infra text accompanying notes 138–56. The following discussion on the factors affecting 
the difficulty of international criminal investigations is rooted partly in literature, which is cited 
throughout. However, it is also based on the Author’s personal experience. The Author was an 
Assistant Prosecutor at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). One of his 
primary duties was overseeing the preliminary investigations related to the “crime base.” He worked 
with analysts and investigators to decide which crime sites to investigate, oversaw the work of 
investigators carrying out the investigations, led a team of analysts who coded the results of the 
investigations and entered that data into a database, provided legal advice on the sufficiency of the 
collected information, and drafted the portions of the first Introductory Submission relating to the 
crime base. His experience at the ECCC informs the discussion of the relationship between gravity and 
investigative difficulty. 
 137. For purposes of this Article, an investigation is successful if all relevant leads are 
investigated and all relevant information is collected. Success is not determined by whether the 
investigation permits charges to be filed but rather by whether the investigation collects the 
information necessary for the prosecutors to decide with confidence whether or not to bring charges. 
See infra text accompanying notes 138–39. 
 138. See Dermot Groome, No Witness, No Case: An Assessment of the Conduct and Quality of 
ICC Investigations, 3 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 1, 3 (2014) (“Credible and reliable evidence is the 
foundation of a criminal case; it underlies each and every aspect of the case that follows an arrest. 
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can proceed without that evidence.
139
 If the purpose of the investigation is 
to collect the evidence necessary to establish whether a particular crime 
has occurred, it stands to reason that the larger the gravity of the suspected 
crimes, the more resources will be necessary to conduct an investigation.  
For example, evidence must be collected about each crime site that is 
part of the investigation. The site must be identified, what occurred there 
must be discovered and documented, and the connection between the 
crime site and the rest of the investigation must be explored.
140
 In effect, 
each crime site that is part of the investigation represents a commitment to 
the expenditure of investigative resources. Therefore, the more crime sites 
that are included in the investigation, the more resources will be needed to 
conduct the investigation. Thus, the data on the number of crime sites 
included in each of the ICC’s investigations acts as an indicator of the 
resources necessary to carry out that investigation. 
It also stands to reason that as the number of victims increases, 
additional investigative resources will be needed. Of course, the needed 
resources do not necessarily scale linearly with the number of victims.
141
 
Nevertheless, it is probably true that the resources needed to investigate 
mass atrocity crimes generally increase as the number of victims 
increases.
142
 Thus, the number of victims of the crimes being investigated 
can affect the necessary investigative resources. 
The legal qualification of the crimes can also impact the required 
investigative resources. The two most commonly investigated 
international crimes—crimes against humanity and war crimes—have 
jurisdictional requirements that must be proved.
143
 War crimes must take 
place during an armed conflict.
144
 Crimes against humanity must take 
place as part of a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian 
 
 
Without it, there is no viable case. The goal of a criminal investigation is to identify and collect 
evidence.”). 
 139. Id.; Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive Tools: 
Three Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings, 2 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 403, 403 (2004) (“No indictment can be issued, and no trial can take place, without 
evidence.”). 
 140. See Ford, supra note 120, at 161. 
 141. A crime with 500 victims requires significantly more resources than a murder case with a 
single victim, but it will probably not need 500 times as many resources. Similarly, a crime with 1,000 
victims is not necessarily twice as difficult to investigate as a crime with 500 victims.  
 142. Cf. Ford, supra note 120, at 165. 
 143. See infra Table 1 (showing that crimes against humanity and war crimes are the two most 
investigated crimes at the ICC). 
 144. See Rome Statute, supra note 28, art. 8. 
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population.
145
 Proving these jurisdictional requirements takes investigative 
resources. For example, establishing that an armed conflict existed 
requires collecting evidence about the length and intensity of the fighting 
as well as evidence about the structure and organization of the groups 
participating in the violence.
146
 Proving that a murder constitutes a crime 
against humanity requires proving that it “was committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”
147
 
Therefore, the investigators must conduct additional investigative work to 
establish that a widespread or systematic attack was occurring at the time 
and that the particular crime being investigated was committed as part of 
that attack. Thus, collecting data on the legal qualification of the crimes 
under investigation can shed light on the investigative resources that must 
be devoted to establishing the jurisdictional requirements of the various 
crimes. 
Significant resources must also be devoted to identifying who is legally 
responsible for the crimes that are uncovered.
148
 A distinction is often 
made in international criminal investigations between the “crime base” 
evidence and the “linking” or “linkage” evidence.
149
 The crime base 
evidence demonstrates that crimes within the jurisdiction of the court have 
been committed.
150
 This evidence arises largely from the investigation of 
the individual crime sites.
151
 While the investigation of the crime base may 
identify some low-level direct perpetrators, further investigation is almost 
always required.
152
 Most international crimes are committed by 
 
 
 145. Id. art. 7(1). 
 146. See infra notes 185, 186 (discussing the legal elements of proving the existence of an armed 
conflict). 
 147. Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(a), ICC Doc. No. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002). 
 148. While one of the key goals of a criminal trial is to establish that crimes have occurred, crimes 
are committed by people. Another key purpose of a criminal trial is to establish which individuals bear 
criminal responsibility for the crimes that have been committed. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 
28, art. 25(2) (“A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.”). 
 149. See Ford, supra note 120, at 159 (describing linking evidence). 
 150. See Investigations, ICTY.ORG, http://www.icty.org/en/about/office-of-the-prosecutor/ 
investigations (noting that the ICTY worked from the “bottom” upwards and began with the crime 
base evidence which identified what crimes had occurred and the “lower-ranking persons who actually 
committed” those crimes). 
 151. Id. (noting that investigators typically begin their investigation by interviewing witnesses, 
then visit the crime site to corroborate the statements as well as photograph the site and collect 
physical evidence). 
 152. See Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 427, 430 
(2004) (noting that the initial investigations at the ICTY turned up “a great deal of information about 
low and middle-level detention camp officials” but that it took considerable additional effort to obtain 
the information necessary to begin indicting those higher up in the hierarchy, “[e]ven though there was 
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hierarchically organized groups working together.
153
 Thus, the 
investigators must also investigate whether any high-level indirect 
perpetrators participated in the crimes.
154
 This aspect of the investigation 
focuses on the “linking” evidence—i.e., the evidence that links the crime 
base to higher-level perpetrators.
155
 Establishing that individuals who may 
be geographically or organizationally removed from the crimes are legally 
responsible for them is one of most difficult aspects of international 
criminal prosecutions.
156
 Moreover, the larger and more complicated the 
organizational structure of the perpetrator groups, the more difficult this 
process becomes.
157
 As a result, establishing individual criminal 
responsibility for crimes committed by large hierarchically organized 
groups is both very difficult to prove in court but also very difficult to 
investigate. Thus, the data collected on the structure and organization of 
the perpetrator groups can shed light on the resources necessary to 
investigate them.  
For these reasons, the factors used to assess the gravity of the alleged 
crimes should act as a reasonable proxy for the difficulty of investigating 
those crimes and the investigative resources necessary to successfully 
complete such an investigation.  
 
 
a general understanding among many of the OTP senior staff that the focus should be on the most 
important perpetrators”). See also Investigations, ICTY.ORG, http://www.icty.org/en/about/office-of-
the-prosecutor/investigations (noting that the testimony of victims provided “invaluable crime base 
evidence and links to the persons who had physically committed the crimes, such as soldiers, camp 
guards and wardens” but that “the challenge was to link the crime base incidents with persons who did 
not physically commit the crime but who may have ordered, planned, implemented or facilitated” 
them). 
 153. See Stuart Ford, Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments, 39 N. 
CAROLINA J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 45, 67–68 (2013). 
 154. See Groome, supra note 138, at 7 (“Often central to an international criminal investigation is 
the question of whether senior officials participated in the crime.”). 
 155. Id. (noting that cases involving senior officials “require investigators to perform the 
additional task of investigating and determining which officials within the chain of command structure 
bear responsibility.”). 
 156. See Ford, supra note 120, § VII(A) (arguing that the difficulty of attributing responsibility for 
crimes to high-level indirect perpetrators who are often geographically and organizationally distant 
from the crimes is the principal cause of the complexity of international criminal trials). See also 
Investigations, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/en/about/office-of-the-prosecutor/investigations (noting that “legally linking the 
persons higher up to the actual crimes committed is not easy and takes time” and that this process took 
“took several years of work by many dedicated present and former members of the OTP”); Mirjan 
Damaška, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 348 (2008) 
(noting the difficulty of proving the criminal responsibility of “high-ranking officials who are remote 
from the immediate perpetrators”). 
 157. See Ford, supra note 120, at 183. 
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III. THE GRAVITY OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 
This part will assess the gravity of the ICC’s investigations and 
compare them to the gravity of a selection of domestic mass atrocity 
investigations.  
A.  The Gravity of the ICC’s Investigations 
As of July 2015, the ICC had begun or completed investigations in nine 
situations
158
: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Darfur, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Libya, Central African Republic (CAR) I, CAR 
II,
159
 and Uganda.
160
 Each investigation will be summarized briefly 
below. The summaries focus on the gravity factors listed above.
161
 They 
are based on the publicly available information about the investigations. In 
some cases, however, that information is incomplete.
162
 
It is also important to note that the information collected below relates 
to the scope of the OTP’s investigation, not the overall scale of the 
atrocities committed. The OTP rarely, if ever, investigates every atrocity 
committed in a particular conflict. For example, several hundred thousand 
people have died in the conflict in Darfur in the years since it began,
163
 but 
 
 
 158. The term “situation” has a special meaning at the ICC. According to Article 13 of the Rome 
Statute, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over “[a] situation in which one or more [of the crimes 
described in Article 5 of the Statute] appears to have been committed.” See Rome Statute, supra note 
28, art. 13. A situation is usually defined temporally and territorially. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 298–99 (Oxford 
University Press 2010). Thus, a situation is a temporally and territorially defined space within which 
one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the court may have been committed. 
 159. In 2014, the OTP opened a second investigation into crimes committed in the Central African 
Republic, but this investigation (CAR II) covers crimes committed from 2012 onwards and is separate 
from the investigation in CAR I, which covered crimes that took place in 2002 and 2003. See infra 
Parts III.A.7 and III.A.8. 
 160. See Situations Under Investigation, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited 
July 21, 2015). This list was accurate as of July 2015, when the data for this Article was collected. 
There were, however, a number of preliminary examinations ongoing at that time and it is possible 
(perhaps even likely) that additional investigations will have been initiated by the time this Article is 
published. 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 119–21.  
 162. For example, the information on the situation in Uganda is incomplete because much of the 
relevant information was filed under seal. See infra Part III.A.9.  
 163. See Darfur deaths ‘could be 300,000,’ BBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2008, 9:38 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7361979.stm (noting that while the government of Sudan estimated 
that there had been 10,000 deaths, the World Health Organization had estimated that more than 
200,000 people had died in Darfur).  
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the OTP’s investigation focuses on only a subset of the deaths.
164
 The goal 
of the OTP when deciding on the scope of the investigation is to select a 
sample of incidents that are representative of the gravest acts and the main 
types of victimization.
165
 This prioritization is necessitated by the Court’s 
limited resources.
166
 As a result, the OTP’s investigations usually cover 
just a small portion of the atrocities committed in any given situation. 
1. The DRC
167
 
The OTP’s investigation arising out of the situation in the DRC 
covered two different armed conflicts that took place years apart. 
Moreover, the investigation covered a period of slightly more than two 
years
168
 and involved alleged crimes committed by four different armed 
groups. Each of these armed groups was a sophisticated, hierarchically 
organized group capable of sustaining significant military operations. The 
arrest warrants show that the OTP investigated crimes committed at 
twenty-four different locations.
169
 The victims of these attacks were 
civilians,
170
 and the OTP alleges that at least 1,000 civilians were 
 
 
 164. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 165. See Situation in the Republic of Côte D’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-3, Request for authorization of an 
investigation pursuant to article 15, ¶ 25 (June 23, 2011) (noting that the “incidents referred to in this 
Application are not exhaustive” and that “[t]he Prosecution selected a limited number of incidents, 
aiming to provide a sample that is reflective of the gravest incidents and the main types of 
victimisation”). See also Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in the Central African Republic II: Article 
53(1) Report, ¶ 95 (Sept. 24, 2014) (noting that the OTP was focusing on the “most serious alleged 
crimes” and that it had received information on more crimes than were described in its report). 
 166. See infra Part IV.A (describing the limited investigative resources available to the Court).  
 167. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in 
Section I of Stuart Ford, The Gravity of ICC Investigations Carried Out Between 2002 and 2015 (Feb. 
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2101764.  
 168. The investigation of the earlier conflict covered the period July 2002 to December 2003, a 
period of eighteen months. See Ford, supra note 167, at 3. The investigation of the later conflict 
covered the period January to September 2009, a period of nine months. Id. at 5. Combined, this 
represents a period of twenty-seven months, or slightly more than two years.  
 169. This includes the six training camps described in the Dyilo arrest warrant, id. at 3, the six 
villages described in the Ntaganda arrest warrant, id. at 4, the village disclosed in the Katanga arrest 
warrant, id. at 4–5, and the eleven villages listed in the Mbarushimana arrest warrant, id. at 5. 
 170. A civilian is a person who is not a member of the armed forces. See JEAN-MARIE 
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
VOLUME 1: RULES 17 (2005), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-
humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf. This contrasts civilians with “combatants” who are those persons 
who are members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. Id. at 11. All persons who are part of 
an organized armed force, group or unit which acts under the responsible command of a party to the 
conflict are thus combatants. Id. at 14.  
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murdered,
171
 thousands of civilians were injured, and at least 140,000 
civilians were forcibly displaced. There were also a large but undisclosed 
number of rapes and instances of sexual slavery, as well as wholesale 
looting and destruction of property. In many cases, the attacks were 
carried out by armed groups associated with one ethnic group against 
members of other ethnic groups for the purpose of consolidating power 
and territory. Finally, the conflicts in the DRC were marked by the 
widespread use of child soldiers. These acts were charged as a variety of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
2. Darfur
172
 
The Darfur investigation involved alleged crimes occurring at more 
than one hundred crime sites over a period of nearly five years. These 
crimes took place during an armed conflict between the government of 
Sudan and various rebel groups. The alleged perpetrators for the vast 
majority of the crimes were armed forces associated with the government 
of Sudan, but the OTP also investigated two rebel groups for their 
involvement in attacks on U.N. peacekeepers.
173
 All of the perpetrators 
constituted hierarchically organized armed groups. The victims (with the 
exception of the U.N. peacekeepers) were civilians who were chosen 
largely because of their ethnicity. It appears that civilians were targeted 
because the Sudanese government suspected their ethnic groups of 
supporting the rebels. All told, thousands of civilians were killed, 
thousands more were raped, and hundreds of thousands were displaced 
from their homes. In addition, there was widespread torture, looting and 
destruction of property. The OTP alleged that the Sudanese government’s 
attacks took place with the intent of destroying certain ethnic groups. The 
crimes were qualified as a variety of crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and genocide.  
 
 
 171. This includes the 800 deaths associated with the UPC/FPLC attacks. See Ford, supra note 
167, at 4, and the 200 deaths associated with the FNI and FRPI attack on Bogoro village. Id. at 4–5. 
This is obviously a minimum figure, as the OTP also alleged that the FLDR murdered civilians as part 
of its attacks, but does not provide an estimate of the number killed. Id. at 5.  
 172. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in 
Section II of Ford, supra note 167.  
 173. Intentionally attacking UN peacekeepers is a violation of the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute 
art. 8(2)(b)(iii).  
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3. Côte D’Ivoire
174
 
The OTP’s investigation in Côte d’Ivoire involved attacks by two 
different sophisticated armed groups
175
 that took place during an armed 
conflict. These groups committed attacks at more than forty-five 
locations
176
 throughout the country over a period of approximately five 
months. These attacks resulted in the deaths of more than a thousand 
civilians, hundreds of rapes, and more than 500 unlawful and arbitrary 
detentions. They were also accompanied by an unknown number of 
instances of beatings, torture, inhumane treatment, and the destruction of 
property. More than one million civilians were displaced by the violence. 
The victims of these attacks were civilians and it appears both sides 
targeted individuals because of their actual or perceived support for the 
other side of the conflict. These acts were alleged to constitute a variety of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
4. Kenya
177
 
The Kenya investigation covered attacks by groups associated with two 
rival political parties that took place in the aftermath of a disputed 
election. Each group is alleged to have had sufficient organization to carry 
out premeditated attacks involving large numbers of attackers at multiple 
locations simultaneously, but they were not alleged to be “armed 
groups.”
178
 These attacks took place all over the country over a period of 
approximately two months, although the investigation apparently focused 
on fifteen locations. More than 1,100 people were killed, at least 900 were 
raped, more than 3,500 were seriously injured, and more than 350,000 
were displaced from their homes. The victims were largely civilians who 
were targeted because of their actual or perceived support for a rival 
 
 
 174. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in 
Section III of Ford, supra note 167.  
 175. The pro-Gbagbo forces included the country’s army, police and security services as well as 
some armed militias. See Ford, supra note 167, at 7–8. The principal pro-Ouattara group, the Forces 
Nouvelles, was organized like a conventional army. Id. at 9.  
 176. The ICC intended to investigate at least thirty crime sites associated with the pro-Gbagbo 
forces and at least seventeen crime sites associated with the pro-Ouattara forces. Id. at 9–11.  
 177. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in 
Section IV of Ford, supra note 167.  
 178. The term “armed group” has a technical meaning in international criminal law and refers to 
certain groups that participate in armed conflicts. To qualify as an armed group, a group must be 
organized, operate under a responsible command, and have an internal disciplinary system that 
enforces compliance with international humanitarian law. See infra note 187.  
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group. The killings were often done in a particularly brutal fashion, with 
victims being drowned, suffocated, stoned, and hung. Rapes and sexual 
violence were also often extremely brutal and female victims sometimes 
had their vaginas and labia cut with sharp objects, while male victims 
sometimes had their penises amputated. These acts were alleged to 
constitute a variety of crimes against humanity. 
5. Mali
179
 
The Mali investigation will examine attacks by five different groups, 
including the Malian Armed Forces and four rebel groups, which took 
place during an armed conflict. Each of these groups is hierarchically 
organized, with two of them functioning as conventional armies and the 
other three operating as smaller, but still organized, armed groups with 
hierarchical command structures. The attacks under investigation took 
place over a period of approximately five months and occurred at no less 
than nine separate locations. The victims were either civilians or 
combatants who were hors de combat.
180
 The ICC indicated that the 
violence resulted in between 100 and 200 killings, between 50 and l00 
rapes, and the systematic destruction of property and religious buildings. 
At least some of the killings were particularly cruel and involved 
mutilating or disemboweling the victims. These acts were alleged to be a 
variety of war crimes. 
6. Libya
181
 
The OTP’s investigation of the situation in Libya focuses on attacks by 
government forces on peaceful protesters. Over the course of 
approximately two weeks, Libyan government forces attacked protesters at 
twenty-six locations. These attacks resulted in the deaths of at least 750 
 
 
 179. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in 
Section V of Ford, supra note 167.  
 180. While it is generally lawful for combatants to attack and kill other active combatants during 
an armed conflict, once combatants have been rendered “hors de combat” (which literally means 
“outside the fight”) by injuries or capture, it is no longer lawful to attack or kill them. See, e.g., Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
(noting that “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any 
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely” and that violence against them is 
prohibited). See also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 170, at 311. 
 181. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in 
Section VI of Ford, supra note 167. 
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civilians, injuries to hundreds more, as well as the arrest, torture, and 
unlawful imprisonment of hundreds. The victims were targeted because of 
their participation in protests against the government. These attacks are 
alleged to constitute a variety of crimes against humanity. 
7. CAR I
182
 
The OTP first investigated potential crimes in the Central African 
Republic that were committed during an armed conflict that took place in 
2002 and 2003. This investigation (called CAR I) covered crimes that 
occurred over a period of approximately six months. The perpetrator is 
alleged to be a sophisticated, hierarchically organized armed group. The 
OTP intended to investigate violence that occurred at seven locations. 
While there were a number of acts of murder and torture, the OTP 
indicated that its investigation would focus largely on rape and sexual 
violence, which it alleged to have been a central feature of the conflict. 
The OTP indicated that there had been at least 600 reported rapes, but that 
the actual number was probably far higher. The OTP alleged that rape was 
used as a tool during the conflict, and that the perpetrator groups 
committed their rapes in particularly brutal fashion, including through the 
use of gang rapes, the public rape of victims, and by forcing relatives to 
participate in rapes. The victims were civilians and these acts were alleged 
to be a variety of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
8. CAR II
183
 
In 2014, the OTP opened a second investigation (called CAR II) into 
potential crimes committed in CAR, arising out of a separate armed 
conflict that occurred during 2012 and 2013. The investigation will focus 
on two perpetrator groups, both of which are hierarchically organized 
armed groups. The OTP will investigate at least thirty-three attacks that 
took place over a period of approximately two years. In the course of these 
attacks, at least 2,600 civilians were killed, hundreds to thousands of 
civilians were raped, thousands of homes were destroyed, and more than 
one million civilians were displaced. The crimes were driven by 
discriminatory motives and virtually the entire Muslim population of the 
 
 
 182. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in 
Section VII of Ford, supra note 167. 
 183. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in 
Section VIII of Ford, supra note 167. 
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Central African Republic was forced to flee the country as a result of the 
violence. These crimes were alleged to constitute a variety of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. In addition, the OTP indicated it would 
investigate whether the deliberate targeting of Muslims by one of the 
perpetrator groups was genocide. 
9. Uganda
184
 
Due to redactions in the public record, information about the OTP’s 
investigation in Uganda is incomplete. The OTP investigated the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), a hierarchically organized armed group that has 
been carrying out an insurgency in Uganda since at least 1987. The OTP’s 
investigation focused on a series of attacks on villages and internally 
displaced persons’ camps that took place during 2003 and 2004, and were 
part of the armed conflict between the LRA and the forces of the 
government of Uganda. There were at least six such attacks that took place 
over a period of several months to two years. These attacks resulted in the 
deaths of a large but undisclosed number of civilians, as well as rapes, 
inhumane acts, and enslavement. The victims were largely civilians, 
including many women and children. Children, in particular, were 
deliberately victimized during these attacks, with the LRA abducting large 
numbers of children to be used as fighters, porters, and sex slaves. The 
crimes were also committed in a particularly brutal fashion, and the OTP 
alleges that many of the victims were hacked or bludgeoned to death. 
These attacks were alleged to be a variety of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. 
B. The Typical ICC Investigation 
Many of the key facts related to the gravity of the ICC’s investigations 
are summarized below in Table 1. All the information in this Part comes 
from the data in Table 1 unless otherwise indicated. It is apparent from the 
table that there are a number of similarities across the situations 
investigated by the ICC. First, the alleged crimes in seven of the nine 
situations took place during an armed conflict.
185
 The only two situations 
 
 
 184. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in 
Section IX of Ford, supra note 167.  
 185. Armed conflicts are either international or non-international in character. International armed 
conflicts occur whenever there is any resort to military force between states. See ROBERT CRYER ET 
AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 279 (2010). Non-
international armed conflicts require “sustained and concerted military operations” between states and 
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the ICC has investigated so far that did not involve an armed conflict were 
in Kenya and Libya. In the latter two cases, there was extensive political 
violence directed at civilian populations, but the OTP did not allege that 
the violence rose to the level of an armed conflict.
186
 Nevertheless, 
widespread organized violence is a hallmark of the ICC’s investigations, 
even when that violence is not categorized as an armed conflict.  
Second, and related to the first point, the vast majority of the 
perpetrators the ICC investigates are members of hierarchically organized 
armed groups.
187
 In eight of the nine investigations, the perpetrators were 
organized armed groups, including in one situation (Libya) that was not 
classified as an armed conflict. Even though it was not an armed conflict, 
the violence in Libya was allegedly perpetrated by the official armed 
forces of the Libyan government.
188
 The only situation where the 
perpetrators were not members of an organized armed group was Kenya. 
Nevertheless, even in Kenya, the violence was perpetrated by groups that 
had sufficient organization and capacity to plan and coordinate large-scale 
attacks on civilians, even if they did not meet the definition of an armed 
group under international law.
189
 
Another facet of the typical ICC investigation is that it involves 
multiple perpetrator groups. Of the nine situations considered above, in six 
of them the ICC was investigating more than one perpetrator group. In 
many cases, this meant investigating alleged crimes committed by both 
sides in an armed conflict.  
 
 
“dissident armed forces or other organized groups” which operate under “responsible command.” See 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977 art. 1(1). It is generally 
accepted that this requires protracted armed violence between organized armed groups. See CRYER, 
supra at 283.  
 186. Armed conflicts require protracted armed violence between organized armed groups. See 
supra note 185. If the violence is not sufficiently intense or the groups are not organized enough, then 
the violence will not be considered an armed conflict. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 185, at 283–84. 
See also Protocol II, supra note 185, art. 1(2) (noting that “situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature” are not 
considered armed conflicts); Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(d) (same). See also infra note 187 (discussing the 
organizational requirements necessary for an armed group).  
 187. To be considered an armed group or armed force under international law, a group must be 
organized, operate under a responsible command, and have an internal disciplinary system that 
enforces compliance with international humanitarian law. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 art. 43(1). See also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 
170, at 15–16.  
 188. See supra Part III.A.6. 
 189. See supra Part III.A.4.  
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The temporal scope of the alleged crimes shows a fair degree of 
variation. In one situation, Libya, the crimes were all committed within a 
two-week period. In a number of situations—like DRC, Darfur, and CAR 
II—the crimes were committed over a period of years. Ultimately, Libya 
appears to be an outlier, and the majority of ICC investigations cover a 
period that ranges from six months to several years. 
There is also considerable variation in the number of different crime 
sites under investigation by the ICC in each situation. On the low end, 
Uganda, Mali and CAR I, all had fewer than ten crime sites each. On the 
other hand, five of the nine investigations involved more than twenty 
crime sites, and the investigation in Darfur covered at least 100 crime 
sites. Ultimately, it appears that the typical ICC investigation involves 
between twenty and thirty separate crime sites.
190
 
The victims that are the subject of the ICC’s investigations are 
overwhelmingly civilians. The ICC does not generally investigate the 
killing of combatants.
191
 The only exceptions to this are the situation in 
Mali, where the ICC investigated the unlawful killing of combatants after 
they had been captured (i.e., the killing of combatants hors de combat)
192
 
and the situation in Darfur where the Court investigated deliberate attacks 
on UN peacekeepers.
193
 Other than this, the ICC has concentrated on 
crimes committed against civilians. These civilian victims are often 
members of vulnerable groups, like women and children. Moreover, the 
victims are often targeted because of their actual or perceived membership 
in disfavored ethnic or religious groups. 
The number of victims of the incidents the ICC investigates varies by 
the type of victimization. Although data on the number of people 
displaced by the violence is missing for four of the situations, it is present 
for the remaining five situations.
194
 And in these situations, the number of 
civilians displaced by the violence ranges from hundreds of thousands to 
more than a million. The number of other types of victims tends to be 
 
 
 190. More technically, the average number of crime sites per investigation was 29.4, while the 
median number of crime sites is 24. Whether one uses the average or median, it seems accurate to say 
that the typical ICC investigation includes between twenty and thirty crime sites. 
 191. See supra note 180 (noting that combatants are generally allowed to attack and kill other 
combatants during an armed conflict).  
 192. Attacking or killing combatants hors de combat is a violation of international law. See supra 
note 180. 
 193. See discussion supra Parts III.A.5, III.A.2. 
 194. It is unlawful to displace civilians from their homes through coercion as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack on a civilian population. See Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(d) (noting that “[d]eportation 
or forcible transfer of the population” is a crime against humanity); Id. art. 7(2)(d) (noting that this 
includes the “forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts”).  
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smaller. Although the data on the number of civilians wounded during the 
commission of the crimes under investigation is missing in six of the nine 
situations,
195
 it seems the number of civilians wounded is typically in the 
thousands.
196
 
Widespread rape is a feature of most of the ICC’s investigations.
197
 
While numbers are understandably vague at the pre-investigative phase,
198
 
it appears that the typical investigation covers crimes that involve the rape 
of hundreds to thousands of people. Finally, the widespread murder of 
civilians is also a hallmark of the ICC’s investigations.
199
 Indeed, Mali 
stands out from the other investigations precisely because the ICC alleges 
that only 100–200 murders occurred while all the other investigations that 
provide specific estimates of the number of civilians murdered report 
much higher figures. Five of the seven situations for which data are 
available report more than a thousand murders. Consequently, it seems fair 
to conclude that the typical ICC investigation involves investigating the 
unlawful deaths of more than one thousand civilians. 
The ICC’s investigations are also often marked by the extreme cruelty 
of the crimes that are committed. Victims are not just killed, they are 
mutilated or disemboweled.
200
 Women (and men) are not just raped, they 
are gang raped or raped in public.
201
 Children are abducted and forced to 
become fighters and sex slaves.
202
 The crimes are also often motivated by 
 
 
 195. This is not atypical. See Stuart Ford, The Complexity of International Criminal Trials Is 
Necessary, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 151, 166 (noting that the indictments at the ICTY often 
failed to contain detailed information on the number of individuals seriously injured during the alleged 
crimes). 
 196. Inflicting injuries short of death on victims can be both a war crime and a crime against 
humanity. See Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(k) (“intentionally causing . . . serious injury”); Id. art. 8(2)(a)(iii) 
(“[w]ilfully causing . . . serious injury”).  
 197. Rape can be both a crime against humanity and a war crime. See Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(g) 
(rape as a crime against humanity); Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxii) (rape as a war crime).  
 198. The ICC usually indicates the number of rapes that have been “reported” to the authorities. 
But it also frequently stresses that these numbers undercount the actual number of rapes that have 
occurred because of poor reporting infrastructure and the stigma that is often attached to those who 
report having been raped. See Situation in the Republic of Côte D’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-3, Request for 
authorization of an investigation pursuant to article 15, ¶ 2, 70 (June 23, 2011); Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ICC-10/09-3, Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, 
¶ 56, 66 (Nov. 26, 2009); Office of the Prosecutor [OTP], Background Situation in the Central African 
Republic (May 22, 2007), 2; Office of the Prosecutor [OTP], Situation in the Central African Republic 
II: Article 53(1) Report ¶ 180 (Sept. 24, 2014). Thus, the “true” number of rapes is likely much higher 
than the figures in Table 1 suggest.  
 199. Murder can be both a war crime and a crime against humanity. See Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(a) 
(murder as a crime against humanity); Id. art. 8(2)(a)(i) (willful killing as a war crime).  
 200. See discussion supra Part III.A.5. 
 201. See discussion supra Part III.A.7. 
 202. See discussion supra Part III.A.9. 
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discriminatory intent, as the perpetrators seek out and harm members of 
particular ethnic or religious groups because of their membership in those 
groups. 
Finally, while there is some variation in how the crimes are legally 
qualified by the OTP, there are also considerable similarities. Most 
noticeably, the OTP has claimed that genocide occurred in only one of the 
nine situations (Darfur). In one other situation (CAR II), it has said that 
genocide may have occurred but that further investigation is needed. In the 
remaining seven situations, genocide is not being considered. In contrast, 
crimes against humanity are alleged in eight of the nine situations, while 
war crimes are alleged in seven of the nine. Thus, the typical ICC 
investigation involves both war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Genocide is rarely the subject of an investigation. 
To put this all together, the typical ICC investigation covers a variety 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the course of 
an armed conflict. The ICC will usually investigate crimes committed at 
between twenty and thirty separate crime sites over a period of several 
months to several years. These crimes are typically carried out by 
sophisticated, hierarchically organized armed groups, and the resulting 
violence is systematic and widespread. In most cases, the ICC will 
investigate more than one perpetrator group.  
The typical ICC investigation will cover crimes that resulted in the 
murder of more than a thousand people, the rape of anywhere from 
hundreds to thousands of people, serious injury to thousands, and the 
displacement by violence of hundreds of thousands to millions of people. 
The victims of these crimes will overwhelmingly be civilians, including 
many women and children. Usually, the perpetrators commit their crimes 
with a discriminatory motive. Moreover, the violence is often carried out 
in particularly cruel or brutal ways. 
This shows that the typical ICC investigation involves crimes that are: 
(1) massive in scale, involving large numbers of crime sites, long time 
periods, and large numbers of victims; (2) terrible in nature, involving the 
most serious forms of victimization like murder and rape; (3) carried out 
in a horrific manner, almost always including the systematic and 
widespread brutalization of the civilian population by organized groups 
acting with a discriminatory motive and often also including acts of 
exceptional cruelty; and (4) have an enormous impact on the victims and 
their societies, resulting in the death or serious injury of thousands of 
people, often causing widespread destruction, and forcing hundreds of 
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thousands of people to flee the violence. Thus, applying the OTP’s 
definition of gravity,
203
 we can conclude that the crimes the ICC 
investigates are extremely grave. As a result, one would also expect them 
to require significant resources to successfully investigate.
204
  
 
 
 203. See supra Part II.A. 
 204. See discussion supra Part II.C (arguing that crime gravity acts as a proxy for difficulty of 
investigation). 
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TABLE 1: GRAVITY OF ICC INVESTIGATIONS
205
 
 DRC Darfur Côte 
D’Ivoire 
Kenya Mali Libya CAR I CAR II Uganda 
Armed conflict? Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
perpetrator groups 
4 3 2 2 5 1 1 2 1 
Perpetrated by 
armed groups? 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of crime 
sites 
24 100 45 15 9 26 7 33 6 
Temporal Scope 2 years Nearly 5 
years 
5 months 2 months 5 months 2 weeks 6 months About 2 
years 
Up to 2 years 
Identity of victims Civilians Civilians 
and UN 
peace-
keepers 
Civilians Civilians Civilians 
and 
combatan
ts hors de 
combat 
Civilians Civilians Civilians Civilians 
Number murdered At least 
1,000 
Thousands At least 
1,000 
At least 
1,100 
100-200 At least 
750 
Unknown At least 
2,600 
Unknown 
Number raped Unknown Thousands At least 
hundreds 
At least 
900 
50-100 Unknown At least 600 Hundreds to 
thousands 
Unknown 
Number wounded Thousands Unknown Unknown More 
than 
3,500 
Unknown Hundreds Unknown Unknown Unknown 
 
 
 
Number displaced At least 
140,000 
Hundreds 
of 
thousands 
More 
than 1 
million 
About 
350,000 
Unknown Unknown Unknown More than 1 
million 
Unknown 
Exceptional 
cruelty? 
No No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Discriminatory 
motive? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Type of crimes WC and 
CAH 
WC, 
CAH, and 
genocide 
WC and 
CAH 
CAH WC CAH WC and 
CAH 
WC, CAH, 
and 
possibly 
genocide 
WC and CAH 
 
C.  The Gravity of Domestic Mass Atrocity Investigations 
The next step is to compare the ICC’s investigations to investigations 
of comparable gravity carried out in domestic systems. Comparable 
investigations, however, are hard to find. One cannot compare the average 
ICC investigation to the average criminal investigation in a domestic legal 
system because they are of much lower gravity. For example, in the 
 
 
 205. The data for this table comes from Parts III.B.1 to III.B.9 above. 
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United States, non-violent drug offenses are the most commonly charged 
felonies, closely followed by non-violent property offenses.
206
 Only 23% 
of felony defendants are accused of a violent crime and most of those are 
charged with assault.
207
 Less than 1% of all felony charges in the United 
States are for murder.
208
 Even when someone is accused of murder, they 
are usually alleged to have murdered only one person.
209
 In short, the vast 
majority of domestic criminal investigations do not come close to the 
gravity of the ICC’s investigations.
210
  
There is, however, a class of cases in domestic systems that are 
comparable in gravity to the ICC’s work—mass atrocity crimes. These 
cases are extremely rare in most domestic systems, but they are the closest 
comparators to the work of international criminal tribunals.
211
 For this 
reason, this section will explore a selection of mass atrocity crimes in 
domestic systems to see how they compare to the gravity of the typical 
ICC investigation. 
There is some disagreement about what the term “mass atrocity” 
means. Some sources suggest that it has a predominantly legal meaning 
and refers to certain international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity.
212
 Others argue that the term should refer to 
the scope of the violence rather than their legal qualification.
213
 For this 
Article, mass atrocity is not used as a legal term. Rather, it refers to the 
extent of the violence. Mass atrocity is defined as any extensive deliberate 
violence against civilians, however it is characterized under domestic or 
international law.
214
 
 
 
 206. THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228944, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 3 (May 2010). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Ford, supra note 153, at 77. 
 210. See Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts, 29 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2014) (arguing that most domestic criminal cases look nothing like the cases 
prosecuted by international criminal courts). 
 211. See Ford, supra note 210, at 59. 
 212. See Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention (United Nations 
2014) at 1 (arguing that “atrocity crimes” refers to crimes that constitute genocide, crimes against 
humanity, or war crimes). 
 213. Scott Strauss, Identifying Genocide and Related Forms of Mass Atrocity 1 (U. S. Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, Working Paper Oct. 7, 2011), https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20111219-
identifying-genocide-and-mass-atrocity-strauss.pdf (noting that while some commentators define mass 
atrocities as those that constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, others use different 
definitions that are tied to the scope of the violence rather than their legal qualification). 
 214. Cf. id. at 21.  
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The following domestic mass atrocity cases were selected: (1) the 1988 
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; (2) the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing; (3) the 1995 bombing of a government 
building in Oklahoma City; (4) the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in 
Africa; (5) the 2005 London Underground bombings; (6) the shootings 
and bombings committed by Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011; (7) the 
shooting down of Malaysian Airways flight MH17 over Ukraine in 2014; 
and (8) the Paris attacks in November 2015. These cases were selected 
based on two criteria. First, they involved intentional attacks on civilians 
that resulted in a large number of victims and thus constitute mass atrocity 
crimes.
215
 Second, information was publicly available about the domestic 
criminal investigations that were undertaken. This latter point is very 
important. Governments do not routinely make information public about 
the size, scope, or cost of domestic criminal investigations. Thus, the 
selection of cases was constrained by the availability of information that 
could be used to compare the size and scope of domestic mass atrocity 
investigations to the ICC’s investigations.
216
  
The selection of cases was also constrained by the availability of 
source material in English. This reliance on English-language sources 
naturally led to the inclusion of a number of incidents that occurred in the 
United States and Britain. An attempt was made to find incidents from 
other countries to balance this. Ultimately, incidents involving Norway, 
the Netherlands, and France were also included. Even after an attempt to 
broaden the scope of the incidents beyond the United States and Britain, 
however, there is still a bias towards wealthy Western democracies.  
This bias means that the information collected below in Parts III.C.1–
III.C.8 is not necessarily representative of all states’ responses to mass 
atrocity crimes. For example, it is likely that developing countries react 
differently to mass atrocities. Among other differences, given their lower 
GDP’s, they probably do not devote the same level of resources to mass 
atrocity investigations that Western democracies do. It proved difficult, 
however, to find reliable public information on mass atrocity 
 
 
 215. See supra text accompanying note 214 (defining mass atrocity crimes). The 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing had a relatively small number of victims and thus does not seem to meet the 
definition of a mass atrocity crime, but it would have had thousands of victims if the attackers had 
accomplished their objectives, see infra note 225, and it makes sense to think of it as an attempted 
mass atrocity crime. 
 216. For example, the 2004 Madrid train bombings were considered for inclusion in this Article 
but were ultimately excluded because it was very difficult to find information about the size, scope or 
cost of the investigation in English. 
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investigations in developing countries. This bias is unfortunate but 
difficult to avoid or compensate for. 
1. Lockerbie Plane Bombing 
On December 22, 1988, Pan Am flight 103 fell out of the sky and 
crashed to the ground near the town of Lockerbie in Scotland.
217
 All 259 
passengers and crew on board the plane died, as did eleven residents of the 
town of Lockerbie who were killed by the falling debris.
218
 The cause of 
the crash was the detonation of an explosive device within the aircraft.
219
 
The investigation initially focused on a terrorist group as possible 
perpetrators before eventually shifting to agents of the Libyan 
government.
220
 The British government prosecuted two Libyan nationals 
for involvement in the bombing, although it has recently indicated that that 
it has evidence against two other Libyan nationals.
221
 
2. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing 
On February 26, 1993, a small group of terrorists drove a rented van 
containing a homemade bomb into the parking lot under the World Trade 
Center Complex.
222
 Shortly thereafter the bomb detonated killing six 
people and injuring more than a thousand.
223
 The bomb also caused 
hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of property damage.
224
 While the 
bomb only caused six deaths, the goal of the bombers was to collapse both 
towers of the World Trade Center.
225
 If they had succeeded, there would 
 
 
 217. See Her Majesty’s Advocate v. Al Megrahi et. al., Trial Judgment, Case No. 1475/99, High 
Court of Justiciary, ¶ 1 [hereinafter Lockerbie Trial Judgment].  
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. ¶ 2. 
 220. See Rt. Hon. Colin Boyd QC, Politics, Crime and Criminal Justice: The Lockerbie Trial, Int’l 
Soc’y for the Reform of Crim. L., 15th Int’l Conf. Canberra, Austl. 4–6 (Aug. 26–30, 2001) (on file 
with author) (noting that the investigation first focused on a terrorist group known as the PGLPGC 
before eventually turning to Libya) [hereinafter Lockerbie Trial].  
 221. See Sewell Chan, 2 Lockerbie Bombing Suspects, Libyans, Sought by U.S. and Scotland, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/world/europe/lockerbie-bombing-
libya.html?_r=0. 
 222. See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. First Strike: Global Terror in America, FBI (Feb. 26, 2008), https://www.fbi.gov/news/ 
stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608. 
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have been a much larger number of casualties. Six individuals participated 
in the plot.
226
 
3. Oklahoma City Bombing 
On April 19, 1995, an explosion severely damaged the Murrah 
Building in Oklahoma City.
227
 The bomb killed 168 people, including 
nineteen children, and injured hundreds more.
228
 The attack was largely 
the work of two individuals, although others knew about the plan.
229
 
4. U.S. Embassy Bombings 
On August 7, 1998, bombs were detonated nearly simultaneously 
outside U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania.
230
 “Two-hundred and twenty-four people died” in the 
explosions “and more than 4,500 people were wounded.”
231
 The 
investigation focused on a small number of terrorist groups with the 
sophistication and motivation to carry out the attacks.
232
 Relatively 
quickly, it became clear that the bombing was the work of a terrorist group 
backed by Osama bin Laden.
233
  
 
 
 226. See Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, supra note 222, at 107–08 (indicating that the participants in the 
plot were Ramzi Yousef, Ahmad Ajaj, Mohammed Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima, 
and Adbul Yasin).  
 227. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 228. Id. at 1176–77. 
 229. Id. at 1177–78. 
 230. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Bombings in East Africa: The Overview; Bombs Rip Apart 2 
U.S. Embassies in Africa; Scores Killed; No Firm Motive or Suspects, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/08/world/bombings-east-africa-overview-bombs-rip-apart-2-us-
embassies-africa-scores.html. 
 231. East African Embassy Bombings, In Famous Cases & Criminals, FBI,  https://www.fbi.gov/ 
history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings. 
 232. See Philip Shenon, Bombings in East Africa: In Washington; Focus on Suspects in Past 
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/08/world/bombings-in-east-
africa-in-washington-focus-on-suspects-in-past-attacks.html. 
 233. See President William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist 
Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan (Aug. 20, 1998), in U.S. Fury on 2 Continents; Clinton’s Words: 
‘There Will Be No Sanctuary for Terrorists’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1998/08/21/world/us-fury-2-continents-clinton-s-words-there-will-be-no-sanctuary-for-terrorists.html 
(quoting President Clinton as saying, “There is convincing information from our intelligence 
community that the bin Laden terrorist network was responsible for these bombings.”); James Risen, 
U.S. Seeks Means to Bring Suspect from Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/20/world/us-seeks-means-to-bring-suspect-from-afghanistan.html; 
David Johnston, U.S. Says Suspect Does Not Admit Role in Bombings or Ties to Saudi, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 18, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/18/world/us-says-suspect-does-not-admit-role-in-
bombings-or-ties-to-saudi.html. 
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5. London Train Bombings 
On July 7, 2005, four bombs were detonated in London.
234
 Three 
exploded inside trains, and the fourth was set off inside a crowded bus.
235
 
The bombs killed fifty-six people, including the four bombers, and injured 
more than 700.
236
 From very early on, the attacks were treated as resulting 
from terrorism.
237
 The investigation subsequently suggested that the 
bombers had met with and perhaps received some training from members 
of Al Qaida.
238
 
6.  Norway Attacks 2011 
In July 2011, Anders Breivik killed seventy-seven people and severely 
wounded forty-two more in attacks that took place in Norway.
239
 The 
attacks took place at two different locations, with the first attack consisting 
of a bomb that damaged government buildings in the center of Oslo and 
the second attack consisting of shootings at a summer camp for youth 
members of the governing Labour Party.
240
 The attacks were the work of 
an individual right-wing extremist,
241
 although there was some initial 
concern that Breivik was working with other extremists.
242
  
 
 
 234. See HOME OFFICE, REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 
7TH JULY 2005, 2005-6, HC 1087, ¶ 2, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/228837/1087.pdf. 
 235. Id. ¶ 2-3. 
 236. Id. ¶ 2. 
 237. Id. ¶ 4. 
 238. Id. ¶ 42-45. 
 239. See Cecilia H. Leonard et al., The Case of Anders Breivik—Language of a Lone Terrorist, 32 
BEHAV. SCI. L. 408, 408 (2014); Walter Gibbs & Elinor Schang, Norway Police to Track Killer’s 
Funds in Year-Long Probe, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2011), http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-5860 
7220110803. 
 240. See Elisa Mala & J. David Goodman, At Least 80 Dead in Norway Shooting, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/world/europe/23oslo.html. 
 241. See generally Leonard et al., supra note 239. See also Steven Erlanger & Scott Shane, Oslo 
Suspect Wrote of Fear of Islam and Plan for War, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2011/07/24/world/europe/24oslo.html; Steven Erlanger & Scott Shane, As Horrors Emerge, 
Norway Charges Christian Extremist, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
fullpage.html?res=9E01E5DE143FF937A15754C0A9679D8B63&pagewanted=print. 
 242. See Norway: Anders Behring Breivik Claims ‘Two More Cells’, BBC NEWS (July 25, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-14280210. 
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7.  Crash of MH17 over Ukraine 
On July 17, 2014, Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was struck by a 
surface to air missile while flying over eastern Ukraine.
243
 The plane 
crashed and all 298 people aboard were killed.
244
 While other possibilities 
were considered, it is reasonably certain that the cause of the crash was a 
surface to air missile fired from a Buk missile launcher.
245
 The flight was 
shot down over an area that was controlled by separatist groups who were 
engaged in an armed conflict with the government of Ukraine.
246
 The 
investigation has focused on the involvement of Ukrainian rebel groups 
with the assistance or support of Russia.
247
 
8. Paris Attacks 2015 
On the evening of November 13, 2015, there was a series of 
coordinated attacks on civilians in Paris.
248
 The attacks took place over a 
period of about three hours and were carried out by three groups of 
attackers.
249
 It appears that nine or ten people were directly involved in the 
attacks.
250
 There were three attacks at a stadium where a soccer match was 
being played, four attacks at restaurants, and an attack on a rock 
concert.
251
 More than 120 people were killed and hundreds more injured 
in the attacks.
252
 Very early on, it became clear that the attacks were the 
 
 
 243. See DUTCH SAFETY BOARD, CRASH OF MALAYSIA AIRLINES FLIGHT MH17 HRABOVE, 
UKRAINE 17 JULY 2014, 9 (Oct. 2015), https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-docs/1006/ 
debcd724fe7breport-mh17-crash.pdf. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 10. 
 247. See Nicola Clark & Andrew E. Kramer, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 Most Likely Hit by 
Russian-Made Missile, Inquiry Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/ 
14/world/europe/mh17-malaysia-airlines-dutch-report.html; Somini Sengupta & Andrew E. Kramer, 
Dutch Inquiry Links Russia to 298 Deaths in Explosion of Jetliner Over Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
28, 2016). 
 248. See Adam Nossiter & Rick Gladstone, Paris Attacks Kill More Than 100, Police Say; Border 
Controls Tightened, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/world/europe/ 
paris-shooting-attacks.html. 
 249. See Adam Nossiter et al., Three Teams of Coordinated Attackers Carried Out Assault on 
Paris, Officials Say; Hollande Blames ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/11/15/world/europe/paris-terrorist-attacks.html?mtrref=query.nytimes.com. 
 250. See Paris Attacks: The Investigation So Far, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-europe-34822265. 
 251. See Three Hours of Terror in Paris, Moment by Moment, N.Y. TIMES (updated Nov. 15, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/13/world/europe/paris-shooting-attacks.html?rref= 
collection%2Fnewseventcollection%2Fattacks-in-paris. 
 252. Id. 
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work of a group inspired by and possibly assisted by an Islamic extremist 
group called ISIS.
253
 
D. Comparing Domestic Mass Atrocity Crime Investigations to ICC 
Investigations 
The descriptions of the mass atrocity crimes above shed some light on 
what the typical mass atrocity crime investigation in a Western democracy 
looks like. This information is summarized in Table 2 below. Unless 
otherwise indicated, all information in this Section comes from the data in 
Table 2. 
On the whole, the domestic crimes appear to be less grave than the 
crimes the ICC usually investigates. First, all the domestic mass atrocity 
crimes took place either at a single point in time or over a very small 
period of time. In contrast, the average ICC investigation covers events 
that occur over months and years.
254
 The domestic investigations also 
involve a smaller number of crime sites. The incident with the largest 
number of crime sites, the Paris attacks in 2015, took place at eight 
locations. Most of the other domestic incidents took place at one or two 
places. The typical ICC investigation, on the other hand, involves between 
twenty and thirty crime sites.
255
 
There is also a difference in the size and number of the perpetrator 
groups. While one of the domestic mass atrocity crimes was committed by 
an individual (the attacks in Norway), the majority were committed by 
small groups of individuals working together. Only one incident, the 
shooting down of MH17 by Ukrainian rebels, involved an attack carried 
out by an armed group. In contrast, almost all of the ICC’s investigations 
involve either large armed groups or the official armed forces of the 
state.
256
 In addition, all the domestic investigations involved a single 
perpetrator group. The ICC is often investigating multiple perpetrator 
groups committing violent acts in the same country at the same time.
257
 
While the victims of both the ICC’s investigations and domestic mass 
atrocity investigations are overwhelmingly civilians, there is a difference 
in the number of victims. The ICC’s investigations typically involve the 
deaths of a thousand or more individuals, injuries to thousands more, and 
 
 
 253. See Nossiter et al., supra note 249. 
 254. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
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the displacement by violence of hundreds of thousands of people.
258
 They 
also usually involve systematic rape of the civilian population.
259
 As 
terrible as the domestic mass atrocity crimes described above are, they 
typically result in hundreds of deaths and hundreds of serious injuries. 
While the number of victims is not the only measure of a crime’s gravity, 
it is a significant factor,
260
 and the ICC’s investigations typically involve 
many more victims than the domestic investigations. They also involve 
types of victimization (rape and forcible displacement) that are not present 
in the domestic investigations. 
Much like at the ICC, a discriminatory motive is a feature of these 
mass atrocity crimes. But, unlike the ICC, none of the domestic crimes 
exhibit the exceptional cruelty that is present in a significant portion of the 
ICC’s investigations. While both the ICC and the domestic investigations 
involved large numbers of deaths, the ICC’s investigations often involved 
acts of exceptional cruelty like forced amputations, death by 
disemboweling, and the sexual mutilation of rape victims.
261
  
 
 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See supra text accompanying note 109. 
 261. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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TABLE 2: GRAVITY OF DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS
262
 
 Lockerbie WTC OK City Embassies London Norway MH17 Paris 
Armed 
conflict? 
No No No No No No Yes No 
Number of 
perpetrator 
groups? 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Number of 
perpetrators 
directly 
involved? 
4 6 2 Unknown 4 1 Unknown 9 or 10 
Number of 
crime sites? 
1 1 1 2 4 2 1 8 
Temporal 
Scope 
1 day 1 day 1 day 1 day 1 day 1 day 1 day 1 day 
Identity of 
Victims 
Civilians Civilians Civilians Civilians Civilians Civilians Civilians Civilians 
Number 
murdered 
259 6 168 224 56 77 298 120 
Number 
raped 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number 
wounded 
0 More than 
1,000 
Hundreds More than 
4,500 
More than 
700 
42 0 Hundreds 
Number 
displaced 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Exceptional 
cruelty? 
No No No No No No No No 
Discriminato
ry motive? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 Gravity is a function of the scale of the crimes, the nature of the 
crimes, the manner in which they are committed, and their impact on the 
victims and their communities.
263
 Taken together, it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that the typical ICC investigation covers crimes of greater 
gravity than the typical domestic mass atrocity investigation.
264
 The ICC’s 
investigations typically involve crimes of a larger scale than domestic 
investigations because they involve a longer time period during which the 
crimes take place, a larger number of crime sites, and a larger number of 
 
 
 262. The data for this table comes from Part III.C.1–8 above. 
 263. See discussion supra Part II.A (defining gravity). 
 264. Indeed, this conclusion is consistent with the purpose of the ICC, which was set up to 
investigate and prosecute those responsible for “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole[.]” Rome Statute, supra note 28, Preamble. The Court was designed to address 
the most “grave crimes” that are committed, crimes that “threaten the peace, security and well-being of 
the world.” Id. 
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victims.
265
 The nature of the crimes investigated by the ICC is also graver. 
While both the ICC and the domestic mass atrocity investigations involve 
large numbers of deliberate killings, the ICC’s investigations also usually 
involve rape, torture, inhumane treatment, and other serious wrongs.
266
  
The manner in which both sets of crimes is carried out is similar in that 
all of the ICC’s investigations and all but one of the domestic 
investigations have involved groups of people working together to carry 
out planned attacks upon civilians. They represent acts of organized 
violence.
267
 The ICC’s investigations, however, often involve acts of 
exceptional cruelty that are not present in the domestic mass atrocities.
268
 
The impact of the crimes investigated by the ICC is also graver than the 
impact of the domestic crimes.
269
 For example, one hallmark of the ICC’s 
investigation is that the violence and destruction causes hundreds of 
thousands of people to flee their homes in search of safety. This forcible 
displacement has an enormous impact on the victims and their 
communities.
270
 Another hallmark of the crimes the ICC investigates is 
that the violence causes a breakdown in state institutions.
271
 In contrast, 
large-scale displacement of the civilian population and the breakdown of 
state institutions were not present in any of the domestic mass atrocity 
crimes. Consequently, the ICC has typically investigated crimes of greater 
gravity than those investigated in domestic settings. Thus, the ICC’s 
investigations should require greater investigative resources than the 
domestic mass atrocity investigations because of their greater gravity.
272
  
But even if the domestic mass atrocity crimes were of the same gravity 
as the ICC’s investigations, the ICC might still need more resources 
because there are reasons to believe that international investigations are 
intrinsically more difficult than domestic investigations even for crimes of 
the same gravity. First, the OTP must allocate sufficient investigative 
 
 
 265. See supra text accompanying note 40 (discussing how the scale of the crimes is evaluated). 
 266. See supra text accompanying note 41 (discussing how the nature of the crimes is evaluated). 
 267. See supra text accompanying note 44 (discussing now the manner the crimes are committed 
is evaluated). 
 268. Id. 
 269. See supra text accompanying note 45 (discussing how the impact of the crimes is evaluated). 
 270. See, e.g., James M. Shultz et al., Internally Displaced “Victims of Armed Conflict” in 
Colombia: The Trajectory and Trauma Signature of Forced Migration, 16 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY 
REP. 475 (2014) (noting that “IDPs [internally displaced persons] experience extraordinary adversities, 
overt danger, and psychological distress throughout all phases along the trajectory of displacement, 
leading to chronic elevation of risks for victimization, physical ailments, and mental disorders”). 
 271. See infra text accompanying note 280. 
 272. See supra text accompanying notes 138–57 (arguing that the scope and gravity of the acts 
being investigated acts as a proxy for the investigative resources needed to adequately investigate 
those acts). 
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resources to establish the jurisdictional prerequisites of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity,
273
 requirements that are generally unnecessary 
for domestic prosecutions. The ICC also generally lacks the coercive 
powers that states possess.
274
 Unlike most domestic investigations, ICC 
investigators will often lack control of the crime scene and will not be able 
to compel the testimony of witnesses or the collection of documents.
275
 In 
addition, certain investigative techniques used in comparable domestic 
investigations may not be available in ICC investigations.
276
 Instead, the 
ICC is dependent on state cooperation and the willingness of individuals to 
be witnesses to build their cases.
277
 Unfortunately, state cooperation is 
often withheld
278
 and witnesses often refuse to participate in the 
investigation.
279
 In addition, the ICC will often be investigating either 
during or shortly after “intense political and social upheavals” 
characterized by widespread violence and a breakdown in state 
institutions.
280
 The resulting instability further complicates 
investigations.
281
 In contrast, while all of the domestic mass atrocities 
 
 
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 143–47. 
 274. See Alex Whiting, Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court, 76 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 174 (2013); Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Prosecuting Massive 
Crimes with Primitive Tools: Three Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal 
Proceedings, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 403, 405–08 (2004). 
 275. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 174. See also Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2016–
2018, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ¶ 24 (July 6, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/ 
070715-OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf (noting that lack of access to the crime scene 
immediately after the crime is committed decreases the quality of evidence and leads that can be 
obtained); Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 274, at 406–07. 
 276. See Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2012–2015, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
¶ 19 (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Strategic-Plan-2013.pdf (noting that the 
OTP is usually unable to use “[s]pecialized investigative techniques” that are often used in national 
jurisdictions like “interception of voice and electronic communication”). 
 277. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 174.  
 278. Id. at 183–85 (noting that state cooperation is “largely outside the control of the [OTP] and is 
highly variable and unpredictable”); Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 274, at 413–21 (describing the 
difficulty of obtaining cooperation from recalcitrant states). 
 279. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 181–82 (noting that “insider witnesses” are often reluctant to 
cooperate because of concerns about their safety, that witnesses may be intimidated by the subjects of 
the investigation, and that “at no time can the prosecution compel witnesses to come to the court and 
testify”); Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 274, at 407 (noting that witnesses are often reluctant to 
cooperate with the court because of fear that the perpetrators—who are often members of the police or 
military—will harm them or their families). 
 280. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 180. 
 281. Id.; see also Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 274, at 406 (“Investigating a crime in an area in 
which armed conflict still rages or has recently terminated is obviously logistically more complicated 
[than most domestic investigations].”); Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience, 2 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 427, 430 (2004) (noting the difficulties of conducting a criminal investigation 
during an armed conflict, including lack of access to documents, crime scenes and witnesses). 
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discussed in this Article were grave crimes, none of them resulted in the 
widespread breakdown of state institutions. Moreover, as some former 
international prosecutors have noted, sometimes even simply identifying 
that a crime has taken place and locating the crime scene can be very 
difficult
282
—a problem that none of the domestic mass atrocity 
investigations have faced. For these reasons, even if the scope and gravity 
of domestic and ICC investigations were the same—which they are not—
the ICC’s investigations would probably still be more difficult and require 
more resources. 
IV. THE INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES AVAILABLE IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS 
Given that the ICC’s investigations generally involve a higher degree 
of gravity and therefore a higher level of difficulty than domestic mass 
atrocity crimes, one would expect that the ICC has investigative resources 
equivalent to or exceeding that which states devote to the investigation of 
domestic mass atrocity crimes. This section explores that issue in more 
detail by looking at the ICC’s resources and comparing that to the 
resources that states devote to domestic mass atrocity crimes. 
A. The ICC’s Investigative Resources 
In August 2015, the OTP released a blueprint for its future: The Report 
of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecutor (hereinafter 
the Basic Size document).
283
 In it the OTP laid out what it views as the 
minimum investigative resources it needs to fulfill its mandate. It is 
important to note what this does and does not include. First, and most 
importantly, the Basic Size document does not describe the resources 
available to the ICC at this time. Indeed, the document notes that 
achieving the goals in the Basic Size document will require substantial 
expansion of the OTP, including a 33% increase in the OTP’s staff and a 
43% increase in its budget, relative to 2015 levels.
284
 The OTP stated that 
 
 
 282. See Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 274, at 406. 
 283. International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Court on the Basic 
Size of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-ASP/14/21 (Aug. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Basic Size 
document]. In the interests of full disclosure, the Author worked in the Office of the Prosecutor during 
the Summer of 2015 and contributed to some parts of the Basic Size document. The Author did not, 
however, contribute to those parts of the document that describe the investigative resources the ICC 
needs to meets its mandate. 
 284. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, ¶ 15, at 5. 
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this increase in resources is necessary to avoid “the present unsustainable 
practice of repeatedly postponing new investigations which must be 
pursued in accordance with the Office’s mandate, or constantly stripping 
ongoing activities of critical resources so as to staff the highest prioritised 
activities.”
285
 
At the same time, the resources requested in the Basic Size document 
are not extravagant. The Court is not asking for sufficient resources to 
respond to every demand on it, what it refers to as a “full demand” driven 
approach to budgeting.
286
 Rather, it seeks a situation where the OTP “will 
be able to adequately respond—with a reasonable degree of 
[prioritization]—to demands for its intervention without undermining 
quality and efficiency.”
287
 According to the Court, funding of the ICC 
consistent with the Basic Size document will result in a pace of 
investigative activities that will remain “below the level of full 
demand.”
288
  
The Basic Size document then goes on to explain what investigative 
resources the ICC would like to be able to devote to an average 
investigation. An average ICC investigation will take three years.
289
 The 
first six months is a start-up phase where the investigative team reviews 
the material gathered during the preliminary examination, “studies the 
culture and context of the country,” and conducts missions to set up 
logistics and security arrangements.
290
  
The investigation then enters what the OTP calls the “full 
investigation” phase.291 During this phase, the investigative team spends 
approximately two years collecting the evidence necessary to send the case 
for trial.
292
 Although the OTP is focusing on diversifying its evidence 
collection to include forms of evidence beyond witness statements,
293
 
 
 
 285. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, ¶ 3, at 3; see also id. at 3 n.2 (noting that the 
unexpected arrest of three outstanding fugitives had hampered ongoing investigations and led to the 
postponement of several new investigations). 
 286. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, ¶ 24, at 9 (describing a “full” demand-driven 
approach). 
 287. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, ¶ 5, at 3; see also id. ¶¶ 25–26, at 9–10. 
 288. See id. ¶ 5, at 3. 
 289. See id. ¶ 9, at 29. 
 290. See id. ¶ 10, at 29. 
 291. See id. ¶ 11, at 29. 
 292. See id. 
 293. For example, the OTP is increasingly relying on “satellite imagery, cyber investigations, 
telecommunications data, crime scene investigations (CSI), [and] financial investigations” to develop 
its cases. Id. ¶ 32, at 46. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2017]   WHAT INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES DOES THE ICC NEED TO SUCCEED? 51 
 
 
 
 
witness statements are still a key part of the investigative process.
294
 Prior 
experience has shown that the OTP requires about fifty to sixty witnesses 
to appear in Court during an average trial.
295
 Given, however, that many 
witnesses are unavailable at trial for various reasons, including witness 
intimidation, the goal is to conduct approximately 170 witness interviews 
to be sure that fifty to sixty witnesses will be available to testify at trial.
296
 
It is anticipated that it will take the investigative team two years to screen 
all of the potential witnesses,
297
 identify those that will be interviewed,
298
 
and take witness statements from the 170 or so witnesses that are 
necessary for the case to be ready for trial.
299
 The OTP will also collect 
between fifteen and twenty thousand pieces of non-testimonial evidence 
during an average investigation.
300
 
After the necessary witness statements (and other evidence) have been 
collected, there is a wrap-up phase of approximately six months. During 
this phase, the OTP develops measures to maintain contact with its 
witnesses and ensure their protection. It also either begins to prepare the 
case for trial (if an arrest is expected imminently or a suspect is in 
custody) or prepares the case to be hibernated (if no arrest is expected).
301
 
The whole process is expected to take about three years. 
The number of staff assigned to the investigative team varies over time. 
While fewer personnel are assigned to the investigation during the start-up 
 
 
 294. See id. ¶ 11, at 29. See also Whiting, supra note 274, at 181 (noting that due to the lack of 
non-witness evidence in the situations the ICC investigates, witnesses—particularly insider 
witnesses—“will continue to be at the center of nearly all cases at the ICC”); but see Office of the 
Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ¶ 25 (July 6, 2015), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/070715-OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf (noting that the 
widespread availability of phones with the capacity to take photographs and record video as well as 
access to the internet has made some types of electronic evidence more accessible). See also id. ¶ 23 
(noting that satellite imagery is also now more widely available). 
 295. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, ¶ 12, at 30. 
 296. See id. 
 297. On average, only about half of those who are screened by the OTP are formally interviewed. 
Id. ¶ 13, at 30–31. 
 298. The OTP indicates that a thorough witness interview takes, on average, about four days to 
complete. Id. ¶ 11, at 29. 
 299. See id. ¶ 13, at 30–31.  
 300. This figure comes from a comparison of the table in paragraph 33 of Annex II of the Basic 
Size document, which indicates that the last three investigations have produced 50,000 non-testimonial 
pieces of evidence (or about 16,700 pieces per investigation) and the statement in paragraph 35 that the 
OTP anticipates collecting about 10,000 pieces of non-testimonial evidence per year during the full 
investigation phase (or about 20,000 per investigation). See id. ¶¶ 33, 35, at 46–47. 
 301. See id. at Annex I, ¶ 18. 
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and wrap-up phases,
302
 the investigative team reaches a peak size of thirty 
personnel towards the end of the full investigation phase.
303
 At its largest, 
the investigation team will have thirteen investigators.
304
 These are the 
individuals that collect the evidence and conduct witness interviews. In 
addition, there are four individuals who input the data collected during the 
investigation into the various databases used to track the course of the 
investigation.
305
 Each team will also have three analysts who provide 
guidance to the investigators, identify additional lines of inquiry, and 
assess the quality of the evidence collected.
306
 The investigation team is 
also supplemented with up to nine personnel from the Prosecution 
Division that provide legal guidance to the investigation.
307
 This latter 
group includes lawyers, legal assistants, and case managers.
308
 Finally, 
one person is assigned from the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and 
Cooperation Division to provide assistance on matters that require the 
cooperation of states.
309
  
While the formal investigative team peaks at thirty personnel,
310
 that 
number may be supplemented with a small number of additional personnel 
as needed for particular specialized tasks. For example, personnel from the 
Scientific Response Unit provide forensic support to the investigations on 
an as-needed basis.
311
 The Operational Support Unit helps design field 
operations so as to minimize risk and maintain security and 
confidentiality.
312
 These additional personnel do not significantly increase 
the size of the investigation team. For example, the Scientific Response 
Unit has only fifteen personnel, who are expected to split their time 
between at least six ongoing investigations.
313
 The Basic Size document 
envisions that each active investigation will be assigned one person for 
forensic work and one person for “cyber investigations.”
314
 The 
 
 
 302. Sixteen personnel are assigned to the investigation during the start-up phase, and twenty 
personnel are assigned during the wrap-up phase. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 25. 
 303. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 25. 
 304. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 30–31. See also Whiting, supra note 274, at 176 (noting that the typical 
ICC investigation used at most twelve investigators). 
 305. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, at Annex II, ¶ 35–36. 
 306. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 37–38. 
 307. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 40. 
 308. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 47. 
 309. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 25. 
 310. See supra text accompanying note 303. 
 311. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, at Annex III, ¶ 8–9.  
 312. See id. at Annex III, ¶ 4–7. 
 313. See id. at 68. 
 314. Id. 
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Operational Support Unit envisions that three people will be assigned to 
each active investigation to contribute to operational planning.
315
 Thus, 
these additional personnel may bring the actual number of OTP staff 
working on each investigation at its peak to thirty-five. 
Thus, according to the model laid out in the Basic Size document, the 
average ICC investigation is expected to take about three years and result 
in the screening of about 350 potential witnesses, the taking of about 170 
witness statements, and the collection of about 20,000 other pieces of 
evidence.
316
 This investigation is undertaken by a team that varies in size 
between sixteen and thirty-five people. But even at its peak, the team only 
has thirteen actual investigators.
317
 This information is summarized below 
in Table 3. 
TABLE 3: THE ICC’S INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES318 
 Peak 
Personnel 
Number of Witness 
Interviews 
Pieces of Evidence Collected 
ICC 35 About 170 About 20,000 
 
It is important to remember, however, that this does not describe the 
investigative resources the ICC actually has right now. This is what the 
ICC is asking the member states to provide in the future so it has sufficient 
resources to conduct “adequate” investigations in situations where its 
mandate requires it to respond.
319
 The ICC’s actual investigative resources 
right now are significantly smaller than what is laid out in the Basic Size 
document.
320
  
 
 
 315. Id. at 67 (noting that “3 persons per active investigation” are assigned). 
 316. See supra text accompanying notes 289–300. 
 317. See supra text accompanying notes 302–15. 
 318. The data in this table comes from Part IV.A above. It represents the investigative resources 
assigned to an average ICC investigation. 
 319. See supra note 287 (noting that the goal of the OTP was to be able to “adequately respond” 
to investigative demands without “undermining quality and efficiency”).  
 320. See supra note 284 (noting that the OTP could only achieve the goals in the Basic Size 
document with a significant increase in its present resources).  
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B. Domestic Investigative Resources 
Having looked at the investigative resources available to the ICC, this 
section will explore domestic mass atrocity investigations. The 
information below attempts to get a sense of the resources that states 
devote to investigating mass atrocity crimes. Data was collected—where 
available—on three factors: (1) the number of personnel assigned to the 
investigation; (2) the number of witness interviews conducted; and (3) the 
number of pieces of evidence collected. These factors were chosen 
because they act as indicators of the resources dedicated to the 
investigations. This data will then be compared to the resources available 
to the ICC. 
1. Lockerbie bombing 
According to the Lockerbie trial judgment, “[a]fter the disaster a 
massive police operation was mounted to recover as much as possible of 
the debris in order to ascertain the cause of the crash.”
321
 This included a 
“massive ground search,”
322
 with investigators “comb[ing] the countryside 
on hands and knees looking for clues in virtually every blade of grass.”
323
 
The ground search involved at least 1,500 personnel.
324
 “Tens of 
thousands of items were recovered, sifted and recorded, and any that 
appeared to be of particular interest as indicating a possible cause of the 
explosion were examined by the relevant specialists.”
325
 All of the parts of 
the aircraft that were recovered were subsequently used to reconstruct it 
“as far as possible.”
326
 
Investigators also devoted enormous resources to locating and 
interviewing potential witnesses, ultimately interviewing more than 10,000 
 
 
 321. See Lockerbie Trial Judgment, supra note 217, ¶ 3. 
 322. Id. ¶ 9. 
 323. A Byte Out of History: Solving a Complex Case of International Terrorism, FBI (Dec. 19, 
2003), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2003/december/panam121903.  
 324. By the end of the first week after the crash, more than 600 personnel were involved in the 
search. See Sheila Rule, Powerful Bomb Destroyed Pan Am Jet Over Scotland, British Investigation 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/29/world/powerful-bomb-
destroyed-pan-am-jet-over-scotland-british-investigation-finds.html. By January of 1988, more than 
1,500 personnel were involved in the search. See Steve Lohr, Thatcher at Rites for Crash Victims, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/05/world/thatcher-at-rites-for-crash-
victims.html. At that time, the Scottish police said the search would continue “indefinitely.” Id. 
 325. Lockerbie Trial Judgment, supra note 217, ¶ 3. 
 326. Id. ¶ 4. 
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people in “dozens of countries.”
327
 The investigation also included 
recreating the explosion by detonating plastic explosives inside a radio 
cassette player placed inside a garment filled suitcase that was itself placed 
inside a metal container similar to that used to load the luggage on Flight 
103.
328
 This was done to demonstrate that the damage to the objects in the 
test was consistent with the damage to the recovered fragments of the 
plane and its contents. Various components of the downed plane were also 
subjected to extensive laboratory testing to identify the presence of 
explosive residue.
329
 
The investigation began shortly after the crash and lasted at least 
through May of 1991.
330
 This means the investigation lasted at least two 
and half years. It also involved collecting evidence in numerous locations 
beyond Scotland.
331
 The Scottish police also received assistance from the 
FBI, the Swiss police, the French authorities, and the German police.
332
 
The personnel requirements of the investigation quickly overwhelmed the 
local police force, which was augmented by officers from all over 
Scotland and England.
333
 It also overwhelmed local financial resources, 
and the central government stepped in to pay for the costs of the 
investigation and trial.
334
 
2. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing 
The investigation was a joint effort of the New York Police 
Department, the FBI, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(ATF).
335
 The initial investigation of the scene of the bombing involved 
 
 
 327. A Byte Out of History: Solving a Complex Case of International Terrorism, supra note 323. 
See also Pan Am Flight 103 Fast Facts, CNN (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/ 
world/pan-am-flight-103-fast-facts/ (noting that more than 15,000 people in 30 countries were 
interviewed). 
 328. Lockerbie Trial Judgment, supra note 217, ¶ 6. 
 329. Id. ¶ 7. 
 330. Id. ¶ 14 (noting that investigative activities were still being undertaken in May 1991). 
 331. Id. ¶ 12 (noting that police visited Malta to collect evidence); id. ¶ 14 (noting that police 
collected evidence in Switzerland). 
 332. Id. ¶ 14 (FBI and Swiss police); id. ¶ 52 (French authorities); id. ¶¶ 59, 73 (German police 
force). See also A Byte Out of History: Solving a Complex Case of International Terrorism, supra note 
323. 
 333. Lockerbie Trial, supra note 217, at 3.  
 334. Id. 
 335. Robert D. McFadden, Crisis at the Twin Towers: The Explosion; Officials Studying Bomb 
Clues Seek Several for Questioning, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/ 
01/nyregion/crisis-twin-towers-explosion-officials-studying-bomb-clues-seek-several-for.html?page 
wanted=all. 
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more than seventy agents from the FBI, ATF, and the New York Police 
Department’s bomb squad who entered the bomb crater to search for 
evidence.
336
 While the number of individuals who worked on the 
investigation from the ATF and the New York Police Department is 
unknown, the FBI has said that at least 700 FBI agents participated in the 
investigation.
337
 
3. Oklahoma City Bombing 
Relatively little information is available about the resources committed 
by state and local law enforcement to the investigation, but the federal 
government contributed substantial resources. The federal response was 
led by the FBI in conjunction with the Department of Justice, the ATF, as 
well as the military and local authorities.
338
 By the day after the explosion, 
the FBI had sent “four evidence response teams and explosive ordnance 
teams.”
339
 The ATF had sent two national response teams and a mobile 
command center and the Secret Service had sent explosives experts.
340
 
The Attorney General indicated that the FBI had fifty more personnel that 
would arrive the next day and that the ATF would send another twenty to 
twenty-five personnel.
341
 She promised that the government would “use 
every possible resource to bring the people responsible to justice.”
342
 
And indeed, the resources available to the investigation grew 
enormously over time. Nearly 2,600 FBI agents worked on the 
investigation during 1995.
343
 While the number of investigators decreased 
over time, three years later, there were still more than 200 FBI agents 
working on the case.
344
 According to the FBI, “no stone was left unturned 
 
 
 336. Joseph B. Treaster, The Twin Towers; Leading Bomb Specialists Sift Explosion Aftermath, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/04/nyregion/the-twin-towers-leading-
bomb-specialists-sift-explosion-aftermath.html.  
 337. FBI 100; First Strike: Global Terror in America, FBI (Feb. 26, 2008), https://www.fbi.gov/ 
news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608.  
 338. See Terror in Oklahoma City: Official Response, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/20/us/terror-oklahoma-city-official-response-statements-president-
attorney-general.html.  
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Howard Pankratz, Bomb Trials Costs $82.5 Million, DENVERPOST.COM (Nov. 3, 1998), 
http://extras.denverpost.com/bomb/bomb1103.htm.  
 344. Id. (noting that 2,592 FBI agents worked on the investigation in 1995, 760 in 1996, 552 in 
1997, and 228 in 1998). 
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to make sure every clue was found and all the culprits identified.”
345
 
During the course of the investigation, the FBI interviewed more than 
28,000 people, followed more than 43,000 leads, and collected and 
reviewed more than a billion pieces of information.
346
 
4. U.S. Embassy Bombings 
Investigators arrived from the United States shortly after the bombings 
to begin looking for clues.
347
 The initial team assigned to the investigation 
of the Kenya bombing included forty-five FBI agents, eleven CIA agents, 
and “scores of military intelligence officers and State Department security 
experts.”
348
 Within a week, the FBI contingent had risen to 120 agents, 
with sixty assigned to each bombing site.
349
 The investigation involved 
searching the area surrounding the blasts, often on hands and knees, 
looking for clues
350
 and trying to reconstruct the vehicles destroyed by the 
bomb to identify the one that contained it.
351
 Ultimately, more than 900 
FBI agents and many more FBI employees traveled to the sites of the 
bombings to collect evidence and track down the perpetrators.
352
 This 
 
 
 345.  See Terror Hits Home: The Oklahoma City Bombing, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/ 
famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).  
 346. Id. 
 347. Jane Perlez, Bombings in East Africa: In Dar Es Salaam; U.S. Experts Arrive to Study Clues 
that Killed 9, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/09/world/bombings-east-
africa-dar-es-salaam-us-experts-arrive-study-clues-blast-that.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fjane-
perlez&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=s
earc. See also Tim Weiner, Bombings in East Africa: The Overview; Experts Starting Search for Clues 
in Kenya Bombing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/10/world/ 
bombings-east-africa-overview-experts-starting-search-for-clues-kenya-bombing.html. 
 348. Weiner, supra note 347.  
 349. Id. 
 350. Raymond Bonner, Bombings in East Africa: The Search; As Rescuers’ Final Hopes Fade, 
Investigators’ Toil Begins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/11/world/ 
bombings-east-africa-search-rescuers-final-hopes-fade-investigators-toil-begins.html. 
 351. James McKinley Jr., Bombings in East Africa: In Nairobi; FBI Sifts Vehicles’ Scraps from 
Debris for Blast Clues, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/12/world/ 
bombings-east-africa-nairobi-fbi-sifts-vehicles-scraps-debris-for-blast-clues.html; see Tim Weiner & 
Raymond Bonner, Bombings in East Africa: The Investigation in Kenya; FBI Reports Finding Pieces 
of Bomb Truck, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/14/world/bombings-
east-africa-investigation-kenya-fbi-reports-finding-pieces-bomb-truck.html; see Jane Perlez, In Tanzania, 
Vehicle Debris Yielding Clues, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/16/ 
world/in-tanzania-vehicle-debris-yielding-clues.html. 
 352.  East African Embassy Bombings, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/east-
african-embassy-bombings (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).  
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eventually led to the arrest of suspects in Pakistan.
353
 The investigation 
was described at the time as the largest overseas investigation that had 
ever been carried out by the U.S. and similar in “size and composition” to 
the investigations of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing.
354
 
5. London Train Bombings 
The investigation of the London train bombings was described by the 
UK government as “enormous”
355
 and it involved a “massive police and 
intelligence effort.”
356
 The British investigators eventually received help 
and cooperation from the United States and more than two-dozen 
European countries.
357
 Within the first year, the investigators had taken 
more than 12,500 witness statements, collected more than 26,000 physical 
exhibits (of which more than 5,000 were subjected to forensic 
examination), and reviewed more than 6,000 hours of video footage.
358
 
Ultimately, the investigators interviewed more than 30,000 people and 
collected 40,000 exhibits.
359
 No information was available on the number 
of investigators involved or the duration of the investigation.  
 
 
 353. David Johnston, U.S. Hopes Arrest in Embassy Blasts Will Break Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
17, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/17/world/us-hopes-arrest-in-embassy-blasts-will-break-
case.html. 
 354. David Johnston, Bombings in East Africa; The Investigation; A Painstaking Search for 
Answers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/12/world/bombings-in-east-
africa-the-investigation-a-painstaking-search-for-answers.html.  
 355. REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005, 2006, 
HC 1087, ¶ 74 (U.K.). 
 356. Id. ¶ 4. 
 357. See Elaine Sciolino & Don Van Natta Jr., With No Leads, British Consult Allies on Blasts, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2005), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9503E6DA123DF932 
A25754C0A9639C8B63&pagewanted=all. See also Don Van Natta Jr. & Elaine Sciolino, Bombs in 
London Are Now Called Military Quality, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2005) http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/07/12/world/europe/bombs-in-london-are-now-called-military-quality.html?mtrref=www.google. 
com&gwh=7DBAB25B22BBF4E66359CE6F4F1A27E2&gwt=pay (noting cooperation with U.S. and 
European authorities). 
 358. REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005, 2006, 
HC 1087, ¶ 74 (U.K.). 
 359. See Lady Justice Hallett, Concluding Remarks, Coroner's Inquests into the London 
Bombings of 7 July 2005, Hearing Transcripts pp. 4–5, ll. 16–25 (May 6, 2011), http://webarchive. 
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120216072438/http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/hearing_ transcripts/ 
06052011am.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2015).  
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6. Norway Attacks 2011 
The investigation of Anders Breivik’s crimes took more than one year 
and the crimes were investigated by a specially created task force 
comprised of more than 100 investigators with specialties in evidence, 
victims, witnesses, and international cooperation.
360
 In the first six weeks 
after the attacks, the investigators interviewed more than 450 people with 
further interviews expected as the investigation continued.
361
 The 
Norwegian authorities received assistance from the governments of the 
U.S., Britain, and other Nordic countries.
362
  
7. Crash of MH17 over Ukraine 
While the victims of MH17 came from about a dozen countries, the 
largest number of victims came from the Netherlands.
363
 Thus, the 
Netherlands has led the investigation into the attack. Substantial assistance 
has also come from Australia and Malaysia. The Dutch government 
described the investigation of the crash of MH17 as “a highly complex 
undertaking, which will take considerable time.”
364
 The team was led by 
eight prosecutors from the Public Prosecution Service.
365
 They were 
supported by an investigation team that consisted of “expert detectives 
from a variety of backgrounds, including international crime, high-tech 
crime, and forensics.”
366
 Investigation personnel also came from the Royal 
Military and Border Police as well as the Aviation Police.
367
 Initially, the 
Dutch sent forty police investigators to the scene of the crash.
368
 It appears 
 
 
 360. See Walter Gibbs & Elinor Schang, Norway Police To Track Killer’s Funds in Year-Long 
Probe, REUTERS NOR. (Aug. 3, 2011), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/08/03/idINIndia-5860722 
0110803. See also Aled-Dilwyn Fisher, Breivik police question ‘Fjordman’, NEWSINENGLISH.NO 
(Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.newsinenglish.no/2011/08/04/breivik-police-question-fjordman/ (noting 
that within two weeks of the attacks, there were already more than 100 Norwegian police officers 
working on the investigation). 
 361. See John Price, Brievik investigation ‘could last several months’, The FOREIGNER (Aug. 30, 
2011), http://theforeigner.no/pages/news/breivik-investigation-could-last-several-months/.  
 362. Gibbs & Schang, supra note 360. 
 363. See Clark & Kramer, supra note 247. 
 364. See Letter to the House of Representatives from Minister of Foreign Affairs Frans 
Timmermans and Minister of Defence Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert regarding the MH17 air disaster, 7 
(Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/parliamentary-documents/ 
2014/10/27/letter-to-the-house-of-representatives-regarding-the-mh17-air-disaster/mh17-letter-2014-
10-09.pdf. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
 368. See Scott Neuman, Australia Sending 190 Police to Secure MH17 Wreckage, NPR (July 25, 
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this was later increased to ninety personnel onsite.
369
 In addition, 750 
police investigators worked on the case in the Netherlands, bringing the 
total number of Dutch investigators to 840.
370
  
In addition to the Dutch investigators, Australia initially sent forty-five 
investigators to the crime scene in Ukraine.
371
 This was later increased to 
ninety personnel.
372
 It was then increased again to 190.
373
 Malaysia sent a 
team of more than 130 investigators and forensic specialists to the crash 
site.
374
 The examination of the human remains was conducted by a multi-
national team of more than 200 forensic specialists from Australia, 
Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, New Zealand, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia.
375
  
The investigation collected nearly 5 billion webpages, viewed more 
than 500,000 photographs and videos, and listened to more than 150,000 
telephone intercepts.
376
 Finally, the Dutch authorities recovered twelve 
train cars of wreckage that were transported back to the Netherlands for 
forensic analysis.
377
 The wreckage was “examined in detail, piece by 
piece.”378 During the course of the investigation, the investigators made 
 
 
2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/07/25/335189945/australia-sending-190-police-
to-secure-mh17-wreckage; Tom Burridge, Dutch military police in Ukraine to investigate flight MH17, 
BBC NEWS (July 26, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28506109.  
 369. See 840 Dutch police officers are involved in MH17 crash investigation, DUTCHNEWS.NL 
(Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/08/840_dutch_police_officers_are/.  
 370. Id.; see also Binnenland, 840 agenten werken aan MH17, NOS (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://nos.nl/artikel/681783-840-agenten-werken-aan-mh17.html.  
 371. See Kristin Shorten, Australian Federal Police join international investigation into MH17, 
NEWS.COM.AU (July 22, 2014), http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/australian-federal-
police-join-international-investigation-into-mh17/story-fnizu68q-1226997936671.  
 372. See Armed Australian soldiers, police deploy to MH17 crash site, RT NEWS (July 25, 2014), 
http://rt.com/news/175444-armed-police-ukraine-mh17/.  
 373. See Neuman, supra note 368. 
 374. See MH17 plane crash: Dutch experts examine bodies, BBC NEWS (July 21, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28399406. 
 375. See FAW Special Operations Flight MH17, https://www.politie.nl/en/themes/qa-flight-
mh17.html. Of these, 120 were Dutch and the remaining eighty were from other countries. Id.  
 376. Somini Sengupta & Andrew E. Kramer, Dutch Inquiry Links Russia to 298 Deaths in 
Explosion of Jetliner Over Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016); Presentation Preliminary Results 
Criminal Investigation MH17, OM.NL (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-
vliegramp/presentaties/presentation-joint/.  
 377. See Letter of 17 December 2014 from the Minister of Security and Justice, Ivo Opstelten, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders, and Minister of Defense Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert to the 
President of the House of Representatives concerning the current state of affairs with regard to the 
MH16 air disaster 1 (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/ 
parliamentary-documents/2014/12/23/letter-about-the-current-state-of-affairs-with-regard-to-the-mh 17-
disaster/ju113980.pdf. 
 378. See Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation MH17, supra note 376. 
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sixty requests for legal assistance to more than twenty countries.
379
 In the 
first five months of the investigation alone, the Dutch government spent 
more than €36 million.
380
  
8. Paris Attacks 2015 
The investigation covers both Paris, where the attacks took place, and a 
suburb of Brussels, where some of the attackers appear to have been 
from.
381
 In the first week after the attacks, the French police carried out 
793 raids and arrested 107 people as a result of the investigation.
382
 By the 
end of the second week, French authorities had conducted more than 1,200 
raids.
383
 More than 10,000 police officers were deployed to carry out the 
raids.
384
 Belgian police also carried out numerous raids in and around 
Brussels.
385
 The French Parliament also passed a law to assist in the 
investigation, which permitted the French authorities to make warrantless 
searches, engage in more aggressive interrogation of individuals, and place 
people under house arrest without judicial intervention.
386
 There was 
considerable international cooperation with the French investigation, with 
the French authorities being assisted by the Belgian, German, and Turkish 
authorities.
387
   
 
 
 379. Id. 
 380. See Ingrid Grindstad, Over 36M Spent on MH17 Investigation So Far, NLTIMES.NL (Nov. 
21, 2014), http://www.nltimes.nl/2014/11/21/e36m-spent-mh17-investigation-far/.  
 381. See Paris attacks: The investigation so far, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-europe-34822265.  
 382. Id. 
 383. See Latest on the investigation into the November attacks in Paris, RFI (Nov. 25, 2015), 
http://www.english.rfi.fr/france/20151125-latest-developments-going-investigation-paris-attacks.  
 384. See Adam Nossiter, Paris Attacks Spur Emergency Edict and Intense Policing in France, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/world/europe/in-france-some-see-
the-police-security-net-as-too-harsh-paris-attacks.html. 
 385. See Andrew Higgins & Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, 16 Arrests in Belgium Terrorism Raids, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/world/europe/brussels-remains-on-
highest-alert-level-as-manhunts-expand.html. 
 386. See Nossiter, supra note 384. 
 387. See supra note 381; see also Michael Safi et al., Paris attacks: investigation spreads across 
Europe as terrorist identified, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2015/nov/15/paris-attacks-investigation-spreads-across-europe-as-terrorist-identified.  
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C. Comparing the ICC’s Resources to Domestic Resources 
This section compares domestic investigations to the ICC’s 
investigations by the number of personnel assigned to the investigation at 
its peak, the number of witnesses interviewed during the course of the 
investigation, and the number of pieces of evidence collected during the 
investigation. While it was not possible to find information on each of 
these variables for every domestic investigation, information on at least 
two of the variables was found for six of the eight domestic investigations, 
and all eight had information on at least one of them. The information on 
domestic mass atrocity investigations is summarized below in Table 4. All 
the information discussed in this Section comes from the data in Table 4 
unless otherwise indicated. For comparison purposes, the ICC’s 
investigative resources are summarized in the right-hand column of Table 
4. As noted above, the ICC expects that an average investigation team will 
have about thirty-five personnel at peak size and that an average 
investigation will screen around 350 potential witnesses, take about 170 
witness statements, and collect about 20,000 other pieces of evidence.
388
  
TABLE 4: INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES IN DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS
389
 
 Lockerbie WTC OK 
City 
Embassies London Norway MH17 Paris ICC 
Peak 
personnel 
1,500 More than 
700 
More 
than 
2,600 
More than 
900 
Unknown More than 
100 
More 
than 
1,300 
More than 
10,000 
35 
Number of 
witness 
interviews 
10,000 Unknown 28,000 Unknown 30,000 More than 
450 
Unknown Unknown 170 
Pieces of 
evidence 
collected 
Tens of 
thousands 
Unknown More 
than 1 
billion 
Unknown 40,000 Unknown More 
than 5 
billion 
Unknown 20,000 
 
Comparing the ICC’s investigations to the domestic investigations 
shows that all but one of the domestic investigations discussed in this 
Article had vastly more resources than the ICC’s investigations. The 
investigation of Anders Breivik in Norway is something of an outlier and 
will be discussed separately. All of the other domestic mass atrocity 
investigations had tens to hundreds of times more resources than the ICC.  
 
 
 388. See supra text accompanying notes 291–300, 310–16. 
 389. The data in this table comes from Parts IV.B.1 to IV.B.8 above, except for the data on the 
ICC, which comes from Table 3. 
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The Breivik investigation looks quite different from the other domestic 
mass atrocity investigations. More than 100 investigators worked on the 
case. This is still three times the number assigned to the average ICC 
investigation, but significantly fewer than in any of the other domestic 
investigations. The Norwegian investigators conducted at least 450 
interviews. This is two and a half times as many interviews as the average 
ICC investigation but much less than any of the other domestic 
investigations.
390
 There is no information on how many pieces of non-
testimonial evidence the Breivik investigation collected. 
The Breivik investigation looks like it had about three times as many 
resources as the average ICC investigation, but it is not fair to compare the 
Breivik investigation to the average ICC investigation for several reasons. 
First, the Breivik investigation involved a single perpetrator, just two 
crime sites, and a much smaller number of victims than the average ICC 
investigation. It was a crime of significantly lower gravity than what the 
ICC typically investigates.
391
 Second, it had a number of features that 
simplified the investigation. For example, the perpetrator was captured 
right away
392
 and left behind a detailed manifesto outlining his actions.
393
 
He also readily confessed.
394
 In short, it was a crime of significantly lower 
gravity and investigative complexity than the ICC typically faces. As a 
result, one would expect it to consume significantly fewer resources. Thus, 
comparing the Breivik investigation to the average ICC investigation is 
inappropriate.  
Focusing on the domestic investigations that are comparable to the 
ICC’s investigations, it appears that those domestic investigations had at 
least ten and sometimes more than one hundred times the resources of the 
average ICC investigation. Starting with the peak number of personnel 
assigned to the investigation, the smallest investigation (the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing) had at least 700 people working on it at its peak. 
The largest investigation (the Paris attacks) had more than 10,000 people 
 
 
 390. On the other hand, this particular comparison may be misleading. The Norwegian 
investigators took 450 witness statements in the first six weeks of the investigation. See Price, supra 
note 361. We do not know the total number of statements they took during the entire yearlong 
investigation, and the final figure may have been considerably larger than 450. 
 391. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the gravity of a typical ICC investigation). 
 392. See Elisa Mala & J. David Goodman, At Least 80 Dead in Norway Shooting, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/world/europe/23oslo.html (noting that Anders 
Breivik had been arrested on the same day as the violence). 
 393. See Steven Erlanger & Scott Shane, As Horrors Emerge, Norway Charges Christian 
Extremist, N.Y. TIMES A1 (July 24, 2011). 
 394. See Steven Erlanger, Amid Tears, Flickering Candles and Flowers, a Shaken Norway 
Mourns, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/world/europe/25oslo.html. 
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working on it. This is anywhere from twenty to three hundred and thirty 
times more personnel than the ICC has for its investigations. Moreover, it 
is important to note that the figures for domestic investigators represent 
minimums and the actual number of investigators involved might be 
significantly higher than Table 4 suggests. For example, information on 
the U.S. investigations only includes data on the number of FBI personnel 
involved even though we know that numerous other U.S. law enforcement 
agencies contributed personnel to the investigations.
395
 There is a huge 
disparity in the number of personnel available in domestic and 
international investigations. 
Looking next at the number of interviews undertaken during the 
investigation, the numbers range from 10,000 on the low end in the 
Lockerbie investigation to 30,000 in the London bombings investigation. 
This corresponds to between fifty-five and one hundred and seventy-five 
times as many interviews as the ICC anticipates taking during an average 
investigation. This is an enormous difference. At the rate of 170 interviews 
every three years (the typical pace for an ICC investigation),
396
 the ICC 
would take more than 150 years to conduct the same number of interviews 
as were conducted just during the Lockerbie investigation. 
Finally, there is more variability in the number of pieces of evidence 
collected during the investigations. On the one hand, the Lockerbie and 
London bombings investigations reported collecting tens of thousands of 
pieces of evidence. This exceeds what the ICC anticipates collecting 
during a typical investigation, but not by a huge amount. On the other 
hand, the World Trade Center investigation and the MH17 investigation 
both reported collecting billions of pieces of evidence. The latter two 
investigations collected thousands of times more evidence than the ICC 
anticipates collecting. 
Even though the data is incomplete—there are a number of boxes in 
Table 4 for which there is no available information—the results are still 
clear. Leaving aside the Breivik investigation, all of the other domestic 
mass atrocity investigations in this study had vastly more resources than 
the ICC’s average investigation. The evidence suggests that these 
domestic investigations have had at least ten times as many resources as 
the average ICC investigation and sometimes more than one hundred 
times as many resources. This is an enormous difference, particularly 
given that the ICC investigates crimes that are more grave and difficult to 
 
 
 395. See supra text accompanying notes 335–37, 338, 348. 
 396. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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complete successfully than those investigated by states.
397
 This strongly 
suggests that the ICC is under-resourced and that it should have more 
resources given the gravity and investigative difficulty of the crimes 
before the Court.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
There is an ongoing debate between states and the ICC over whether 
the Court has sufficient resources.
398
 This Article sheds light on that 
question by comparing the court’s investigations to comparable 
investigations carried out by states. The first and most important 
conclusion of this Article is that the ICC is enormously under-resourced 
compared to domestic mass atrocity investigations in Western Europe and 
the United States. The ICC tackles investigations that are greater in gravity 
and difficulty than even the most serious domestic mass atrocity 
investigations.
399
 As terrible as the domestic crimes described in this 
Article are, the ICC regularly investigates situations with more victims of 
all types.
400
 Its investigations also involve larger numbers of perpetrator 
groups, more crime sites, and crimes that take place over a much longer 
period of time.
401
 They also tend to involve acts of exceptional brutality 
and have a larger impact on the societies where they take place.
402
 As a 
result of the greater gravity and difficulty of the ICC investigations, they 
require greater investigative resources than the domestic investigations 
described in this Article.
403
 
Yet, the ICC has vastly fewer resources than most domestic mass 
atrocity investigations. The ICC’s investigative teams peak at thirty-five 
personnel, of which only thirteen are actual investigators.
404
 In contrast, 
states regularly assign a thousand or more personnel to the most serious 
domestic crimes. For example, more than 1,500 personnel worked on the 
Lockerbie investigation, more than 2,600 worked on the Oklahoma City 
bombing, and more than 1,300 worked on the MH17 crash 
investigation.
405
 In many cases, the actual numbers of investigators 
 
 
 397. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 398. See supra text accompanying notes 1–6. 
 399. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 400. Id.  
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 405. See supra Table 4. 
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assigned to the domestic investigations may well be higher than these 
numbers suggest.
406
 Domestic investigations also regularly interview tens 
of thousands of witnesses, compared to just 170 for the ICC. For example, 
more than 10,000 witnesses were interviewed during the Lockerbie 
investigation, 28,000 were interviewed during the Oklahoma City 
investigation, and more than 30,000 were interviewed during the London 
investigation.
407
 Ultimately, domestic mass atrocity investigations in the 
United States and Western Europe usually have tens to hundreds of times 
more resources available to them than the average ICC investigation, 
despite being intrinsically less difficult investigations.
408
 This shows that 
the ICC does not have sufficient resources to conduct the extremely 
difficult investigations it is tasked with completing. 
This Article’s second conclusion is that the ICC’s relative lack of 
resources is partly to blame for some of the difficulties it has faced. The 
ICC has been less effective than was expected.
409
 There are many reasons 
for this, but one of the most important is that it does not have the resources 
to conduct the kind of investigations that are necessary to respond to mass 
atrocity crimes.
410
 To put it bluntly, it appears that several early cases 
were compromised by the lack of investigative resources.
411
 Of course, the 
lack of resources is not the only cause of the ICC’s difficulties. It appears 
 
 
 406. For example, we know only the number of FBI agents assigned to the World Trade Center, 
Oklahoma City and Embassy bombing investigations, but each of these investigations was a joint 
investigation with other agencies. We do not know how many personnel from these other agencies 
participated in the investigations. See supra text accompanying notes 335–37, 338, 348. Thus, it seems 
certain that the figures shown in Table 4 undercount the actual number of investigators assigned to 
those investigations. 
 407. See supra Table 4. 
 408. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
 409. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 164 (noting that “the OTP has not to date had the successes it 
had hoped for or expected”); Dermot Groome, No Witness, No Case: An Assessment of the Conduct 
and Quality of ICC Investigations, 3 PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 1, 1–3 (2014). 
 410. See Dermot Groome et al., Expert Initiative on Promoting Effectiveness at the International 
Criminal Court, 62–63 (Dec. 2014), https://dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/Groome-ICC-
Expert-Report-Dec-2-2014.pdf (noting that some of the problems that gave rise to flawed 
investigations at the ICC stemmed from “a lack of sufficient capacity to investigate these complex 
crimes” and concluding that the OTP “appears to lack the resources it needs to adequately investigate 
situations to the high standard required”). 
 411. See Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan June 2012-2015, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT ¶ 17-18 (2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Strategic-Plan-2013.pdf (noting that 
the OTP lacked the resources to fully staff its investigations and that the judges had indicated that they 
expected the OTP to develop “a more substantial range of evidence in its cases”); Id. ¶ 23 (noting that 
the OTP will try to “expand and diversify its collection of evidence so as to meet the expectations of 
Chambers”). See also Whiting, supra note 274, at 164 (noting that some of the ICC’s judges were 
concerned that the ICC’s cases were not strong enough and that they relied on “undeveloped 
evidence”). 
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that the OTP also made some strategic mistakes in its early investigations 
which undermined several of its cases,
412
 but the OTP has made changes 
in recent years to improve its investigative technique to address many of 
these problems.
413
 The resource deficit, however, persists. 
In contrast, the domestic mass atrocity investigations described in this 
Article had the resources to conduct extremely thorough investigations.
414
 
Moreover, most of the domestic mass atrocity investigations described in 
this Article can probably be described as successful in the sense that they 
succeeded in identifying and bringing to justice many of those responsible 
for the atrocities.
415
 But this success is due, at least in part, to the 
enormous resources allocated to those investigations. They have been able 
to follow every lead, question every potential witness, and collect every 
piece of evidence.
416
 The ICC’s investigations, in comparison, are much 
 
 
 412. See generally Groome, supra note 409. See also Groome et al., supra note 410, at 52–61 
(describing various shortcomings in the ICC’s investigations). 
 413. See Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
¶ 1, 13 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/070715-OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf (noting 
that a switch from “focused” investigations to “open-ended, in-depth investigations” had improved the 
quality of ICC investigations as indicated by the rate at which the Pre-Trial Chamber had confirmed 
charges). 
 414. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing the resources available in domestic mass atrocity 
investigations). 
 415. For example, the United States has been quite successful in investigating and prosecuting 
those responsible for mass atrocity crimes. See Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Prosecuting and 
Detaining Terror Suspects in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, DOJ (June 9, 2009), http://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheet-prosecuting-and-detaining-terror-suspects-us-criminal-justice-system; 
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, TRYING TERROR SUSPECTS IN FEDERAL COURTS, (2016), https://www.human 
rightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/USLS-Fact-Sheet-Courts.pdf (noting that U.S. courts have 
successfully prosecuted almost 500 individuals for terrorism-related charges since the September 11th 
attacks); Phil Hirschkorn, Another Successful Terrorism Trial Inside the US, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 27, 
2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/20504/successful-terrorism-trial-us-bin-ladens-man-london-facing-
life-prison/ (noting that the US was able to successfully prosecute those responsible for the East 
African embassy bombings); Matt Apuzzo, A Holder Legacy: Shifting Terror Cases to the Civilian 
Courts, and Winning, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/us/a-holder-
legacy-shifting-terror-cases-to-the-courts-and-winning.html. The United Kingdom also appears to have 
been relatively successful in investigating and prosecuting such crimes. See MI5, Arrests and 
Convictions, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/terrorism/international-
terrorism/arrests-and-convictions.html (last visited Sep. 17, 2016). 
 416. See supra text accompanying note 345 (noting that domestic investigations have been able to 
“leave no stone unturned” in investigating mass atrocity crimes). In other examples, President Clinton, 
in the aftermath of the U.S. Embassy bombings, vowed to “use all means at our disposal to bring those 
responsible to justice no matter what or how long it takes.” See Philip Shenon, Bombings in East 
Africa: In Washington; Focus on Suspects in Past Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/08/world/bombings-in-east-africa-in-washington-focus-on-suspects-
in-past-attacks.html. After the London train bombings, Prime Minister Tony Blair promised that 
“[t]here will of course now be the most intense police and security service action to make sure that we 
bring those responsible to justice.” See Associated Press, Blair delivers a classically British rallying 
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different. The average ICC investigation will only have a total of thirteen 
investigators and will only take about 170 witness statements.
417
 The ICC 
investigators cannot hope to follow every lead or talk to every potential 
witness. The resulting investigations are surely weaker than they would 
have been if the ICC had the same resources as comparable domestic 
investigations.
418
 Thus, it appears that the ICC’s lack of resources is at 
least partly to blame for its relative lack of success. 
This Article’s third conclusion relates to the role of international 
cooperation in the success of mass atrocity investigations. One of the 
obstacles the ICC faces is a lack of state cooperation.
419
 The ICC is 
weaker than any state, even states like Sudan that have been largely 
ostracized by the international community.
420
 Due to the absence of strong 
international support, Sudan has been able to effectively stonewall the 
ICC.
421
 As a result, the ICC has publicly acknowledged that it is unable to 
successfully investigate or prosecute crimes committed in Darfur without 
international support.
422
 The ICC’s experience in Sudan demonstrates that 
the Court cannot succeed unless states that support it apply pressure on 
recalcitrant states.
423
 This conclusion is reinforced by the study of 
domestic mass atrocity investigations contained in this Article.  
A prominent feature of the domestic investigations discussed in this 
Article is the importance of state cooperation for the success of mass 
atrocity investigations. For example, the Lockerbie investigation relied 
upon cooperation from the U.S., French, Swiss, and German authorities.
424
 
The U.S. Embassy bombings investigation relied upon cooperation from 
Kenya and Tanzania for access to the crime sites. The British investigation 
of the London train bombings relied upon cooperation from the United 
States and more than two dozen European countries.
425
 The Norwegian 
investigation of Anders Breivik relied upon cooperation from the U.S., 
 
 
cry, NBC NEWS (July 7, 2005), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8502984/ns/world_news-attacks_on_ 
london/t/blair-delivers-classically-british-rallying-cry/#.Vk-cGHarTcs. 
 417. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 418. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 164 (noting that “the OTP may never be able to conduct 
investigations that are as comprehensive as what can be done in a national jurisdiction”). 
 419. See supra text accompanying note 278. 
 420. See Stuart Ford, The ICC and the Security Council: How Much Support Is There For Ending 
Impunity?, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 33, 62–63 (2016). 
 421. Id. at 38. 
 422. Id. at 34. 
 423. Id. at 63–64. 
 424. See supra text accompanying notes 331–32. 
 425. See supra text accompanying note 357. 
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Britain, and other Nordic countries.
426
 The MH17 crash investigation 
required close cooperation between investigators from the Netherlands, 
Australia, and Malaysia.
427
 In addition, these three countries received 
support and cooperation from Germany, Belgium, New Zealand, Indonesia 
and many other countries.
428
 The investigators were also dependent on 
cooperation from both Ukraine and the Ukrainian rebels for access to the 
crime scene. Russia’s refusal to cooperate, on the other hand, has made the 
MH17 crash investigation much harder.
429
 Finally, the French 
investigation of the Paris attacks received cooperation from Belgian, 
German, and Turkish authorities.
430
  
As these examples show, international cooperation is vital to the 
success of mass atrocity investigations, whether they are domestic or 
international. While domestic investigations were generally able to secure 
the cooperation of other states, the ICC has had difficulty securing state 
cooperation. The inability to secure state cooperation is another reason the 
ICC has been less successful than domestic mass atrocity investigations. 
This Article’s fourth and final conclusion is that the ICC’s investigative 
resources should be significantly increased because that will improve the 
Court’s outcomes. The ICC is under-resourced which is at least partly to 
blame for its lack of success. Moreover, the comparison between domestic 
and international investigations suggests that the ICC would be more 
successful if it had the resources to conduct investigations more like those 
carried out in response to domestic mass atrocity crimes. This leads to the 
conclusion that significantly increasing the ICC’s investigative resources 
would improve the ICC’s success.  
Moreover, by focusing on the question of success it may be possible to 
convince the members of the Assembly of States Parties to support an 
increase in the ICC’s resources. First, there is broad support for the 
 
 
 426. See supra text accompanying note 362. 
 427. See supra Part IV.B.7. 
 428. See supra text accompanying note 375. 
 429. For example, the Russian government has consistently denied that a missile caused the crash 
and offered its own “evidence” to support this claim. See Sengupta & Kramer, supra note 376. This 
has forced the MH17 investigation team to spend considerable time investigating and ruling out these 
alternative theories. See Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation MH17, supra note 
376 (noting that alternative theories needed to be carefully investigated so that if defendants presented 
them in court the prosecution would be ready to “demonstrate that they did not take place”). The 
Russian government also refused to provide relevant information in its custody to the investigation. 
See Sengupta & Kramer, supra note 376 (noting that the Russian government had refused to provide 
radar data despite being asked to do so). 
 430. See supra text accompanying note 387. 
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success of the ICC within the international community.
431
 Most states 
agree that there should be an end to impunity and that the ICC represents 
one of the international community’s signature initiatives to end 
impunity.
432
 There are 124 state parties to the Rome Statute
433
 and support 
for the ICC exists on virtually every continent, including Europe, Central 
America, South America, and Africa.
434
 Even Russia and China, the two 
states who have done the most to block support for the ICC at the 
international level, agree in principle that the Court should be 
successful.
435
 
Second, states are rational actors who make decisions on whether to 
create or become members of international organizations based on a 
calculation of costs and benefits.
436
 Thus, an economic argument may be 
more persuasive for member states than a moral one. The ICC was 
established to achieve certain goals.
437
 States pay for the ICC with the 
expectation that it will be successful in achieving these goals.
438
 They 
want the ICC to be successful in achieving these goals.
439
 By increasing 
the ICC’s investigative resources, states can improve the Court’s 
likelihood of success and thereby derive greater benefit from membership 
in the Court. Thus, by focusing on the relationship between investigative 
resources and success, it may be possible to convince states that increasing 
the ICC’s investigative resources is in their own interests. 
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